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I. INTRODUCTION
Title IX was landmark legislation in 1972, promising to secure equal
educational opportunities to girls and women and recognizing the impor-
tance of education to women’s lifelong opportunity and economic security.1
Title IX has many successes to its credit, including opening the doors of
higher education to women and equalizing (if still only partially) athletic
opportunities for women and men. Less attention has been paid to the law’s
intersection with pregnancy and reproduction, even though pregnancy and
maternity were at the time, and remain, significant obstacles to educational
attainment for many girls and young women. Because of the overlap be-
tween reproductive age and the years in which girls and women are students,
navigating pregnancy and education is of crucial importance for women’s
equality.2 Although causality is more complicated than one might assume,3 it
is undeniable that becoming pregnant and having a child impose significant
challenges to women’s educational success.4 Yet, from the beginning, Title
IX has treated pregnancy as a fait accompli, an equality issue to be reckoned
with only after a student’s pregnancy affects her educational opportunity.
Nowhere is this limited range more evident than in the statute’s ap-
proach to abortion. In a legislative compromise, Title IX was amended to
include an abortion carve-out—a provision declining to place any obligation
1 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018).
2 See Francesca Cocuzza, Title IX’s Reproductive Remedies, 32 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 211, 221–22 (2017) (noting that half of all pregnancies are unintended and that the
highest rates of unintended pregnancy are among teens and women in their early
twenties).
3 See Jennifer B. Kane et al., The Educational Consequences of Teen Childbearing,
50 DEMOGRAPHY 2129 (2013) (exploring the significance of methodology in ascertaining
causal connection between educational attainment and teen motherhood).
4 See, e.g., Liz Watson & Peter Edelman, From Fragmentation to Integration: A
Comprehensive Policy Approach to Serving Young Mothers and Their Families Through
School-Based Interventions, 20 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 269, 274 (2013) (“Only
50% of teen mothers get a high school diploma by age twenty-two, compared to 90% of
teen girls who do not give birth. Nationally, 30% of all teen girls who dropped out of
high school cite pregnancy or parenthood as a reason for dropping out. Among minority
students the rate is even higher; 36% of Hispanic girls and 38% of African American
girls cite pregnancy or parenthood as a reason for dropping out.”); Nat’l Campaign to
Prevent Teen & Unplanned Pregnancy, Unplanned Pregnancy Among College Students,
1, 1 (2015) (“61 percent of community college students who have children after enrolling
do not complete finish their education, a figure that is 65 percent higher than for women
who do not have children while in college.”); Pregnancy Prevention: Adverse Effects,
YOUTH.GOV, https://youth.gov/youth-topics/pregnancy-prevention/adverse-effects-teen-
pregnancy [https://perma.cc/VMA8-HMN6] (“By age 22, only around 50 percent of teen
mothers have received a high school diploma and only 30 percent have earned a General
Education Development (GED) certificate, whereas 90 percent of women who did not
give birth during adolescence receive a high school diploma. Only about 10 percent of
teen mothers complete a two- or four-year college program.”); see also Deborah Dinner,
The Costs of Reproduction: History and the Legal Construction of Sex Equality, 46
HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 415 (2017) (exploring the costs to human capital of pregnancy
and childrearing).
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on educational institutions to provide access to abortion services.5 The
broader message is that abortion is of no concern to Title IX’s promise of
women’s equality in education. While the statute explicitly disclaims any
applicability to abortion, it is silent about what sex equality might mean for
securing access to contraception as part of the school’s student health ser-
vices under the law’s nondiscrimination mandate. That silence has been un-
derstood as indicative of a lack of coverage. In practical effect, Title IX
touches women’s reproductive lives only at the point that pregnancy affects a
student’s educational career. Pregnancy is recognized as a sex equality issue
affecting education, but pregnancy prevention and termination are not. The
separation of pregnancy from women’s control over reproduction more gen-
erally undermines the overarching promise of Title IX, even as it has the
(unintended?) consequence of hurting the case for reproductive rights for
girls and young women.
With no footprint in Title IX, the reproductive rights of women in rela-
tion to education have been left to other sources of law. The legal framework
governing reproductive rights is grounded in liberty rather than sex equality.
The main federal source of rights to prevent or terminate pregnancy is the
constitutional right to privacy recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut and
extended and refined in subsequent cases.6 Privacy, a dimension of liberty,
as a source of women’s reproductive rights is vulnerable to critique for many
reasons. It is particularly inadequate when it comes to protecting a right to
pregnancy avoidance for minors—a group particularly vulnerable to negative
educational effects resulting from pregnancy. Minors’ self-determination
rights give way to parental rights in many settings, making restrictions on
minors’ rights to terminate pregnancy difficult to challenge as a violation of
liberty. Minors’ access to contraception is also subject to parental limitation,
a problem exacerbated by the new domestic gag rule curtailing the number
of Title X clinics, which provide contraception to teens without parental con-
sent. Even young women who are of majority age must reckon with how the
exercise of their liberty affects others, including (as constitutional law has
developed) the state’s interest in protecting the unborn. Young women with
few resources and those in coercive relationships are particularly poorly
positioned to exercise their liberty to prevent or terminate a pregnancy.
One consequence of situating women’s reproductive rights in a legal
framework grounded in liberty, rather than as a dimension of women’s
equality protected by anti-discrimination law, is that the educational conse-
quences of restrictions on women’s reproductive control have been largely
obscured. For young women in particular, the inadequacy of the existing
liberty-based framework for protecting reproductive rights is exacerbated by
the absence of any focus on the educational consequences of failing to fully
5 See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 38(b) (codified at
20 U.S.C. § 1688 (2018)).
6 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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protect young women’s ability to avoid maternity. The framing of the right
as a matter of privacy does not invite any emphasis on educational equality
for girls and women. Moreover, the public discourse surrounding abortion as
it relates to young women almost never captures the educational impacts of
unwanted pregnancy.
Because Title IX largely carved out reproductive rights from its cover-
age, Title IX’s equality-based approach to women’s rights in education does
too little too late to address the educational impact of unwanted pregnancy
on girls and women. Neither the statute nor the Title IX regulations require
changes to the curriculum, such as effective sex education. Despite the docu-
mented ineffectiveness of abstinence education and the presence of sex ste-
reotypes shaming female sexuality, Title IX has not been a source of rights
in challenging such programming. Nor has it been a vehicle for securing
access to contraception or abortion for girls and young women in school
who fear the educational impact of pregnancy. Instead, Title IX provides a
limited set of rights for students who find themselves pregnant or are recov-
ering from childbirth. After giving birth, students who are parenting a young
child receive even less help from Title IX. To be sure, Title IX was a major
step forward for protecting educational opportunity for students while they
are pregnant; yet it has been inadequate to address educational disadvantages
girls and women face resulting from lack of control over their reproductive
lives.
Despite having been in effect since 1975,7 the Title IX regulation ad-
dressing pregnancy discrimination has rarely been invoked in litigation, and
most challenges have been brought by students at the college or graduate
school level.8 The relevant cases reveal an equality paradigm that blocks
punitive responses to pregnancy but fails to ensure that pregnancy and new
parenthood will not interfere with a student’s educational opportunity.
Younger students, those in high school and middle school, have gained even
less from this set of rights, as they are unlikely to have the resources to know
or assert their rights. Without a lost scholarship or other financial penalty,
their case may be mooted before it can be decided in court. Although the
regulation expressly guarantees a formerly pregnant student who takes an
educational leave the right to reinstatement at the conclusion of her preg-
nancy, it does not require schools to provide the supports that pregnant stu-
dents or new mothers might actually need to succeed in the program.9
Separate schools for pregnant and parenting students have declined in recent
years—a largely positive development given their weak academic pro-
grams.10 However, the mainstreaming of pregnant and parenting students has
7 34 C.F.R. § 106.40(b) (2020).
8 See infra at Part I.B.5.
9 34 C.F.R. § 106.40(b) (2020).
10 See Tamara S. Ling, Lifting Voices: Towards Equal Education for Pregnant and
Parenting Students in New York City, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2387 (2002) (criticizing
separate schools for pregnant and parenting students); Ben Arnoldy, Special Schools for
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contributed to a lack of visibility and attention to this population of students,
who often get lost in the system. Racial and class-based stratification in edu-
cation compound the challenges pregnant students face. Title IX guarantees
pregnant students only the right to equal treatment compared to students
with other temporary disabilities; it offers no help to students in under-
resourced schools that do too little for those students too.
This article elaborates on and critiques the law’s separation of preg-
nancy, with rights grounded in sex equality under Title IX, from reproduc-
tive control, which the law treats as a matter of privacy, a species of liberty
under the due process clause. While pregnancy is the subject of Title IX
protection, reproductive control is parceled off into a separate legal frame-
work grounded in privacy, rather than recognized as a matter that directly
implicates educational equality. This fragmentation was not an inevitable
development in the law. The right to prevent an unwanted pregnancy might
have been better understood as a matter of both liberty and equality. Various
of the Justices’ opinions in the foundational Casey decision refining Roe’s
constitutional framework for abortion rights have recognized as much, at
least in dicta.11 And yet, Title IX links pregnancy to educational equality for
girls and women only at the point when pregnancy affects schooling. In par-
celing out pregnancy prevention from Title IX’s protections, the statute’s
broad promise of sex equality in education for all girls and women was
doomed to fall short. The law’s division between educational equality and
liberty in two non-intersecting sets of legal rights has done no favors to the
reproductive rights movement either. By giving a formal “right” to stay in
school and the right to equal treatment with temporarily disabled students,
Title IX may be strategically deployed by proponents of restricting abortion
rights to minimize the educational consequences of involuntary motherhood.
The hard realities of how pregnancy and parenting impact schooling are
obscured.
This article explores the legal divide between pregnancy discrimination
and reproductive rights in relation to education in three parts. Part I dis-
cusses the rights included in, and omitted from, Title IX relating to preg-
nancy and reproduction. As previewed above, Title IX rights for students
come into play only once a woman becomes pregnant; the law offers no
support for preventing or ending pregnancy. Part II surveys the liberty-based
reproductive rights framework for pregnancy prevention and termination,
and discusses its limits in protecting young women from the educational
effects of unwanted pregnancy and motherhood. Part III concludes by dis-
cussing the implications of separating out pregnancy discrimination from the
broader set of reproductive rights and elaborating on the harms that flow
Pregnant Girls?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 30, 2008), https://www.csmonitor.com/
USA/Politics/2008/0430/p02s01-uspo.html [https://perma.cc/XV5T-UB58] (“Separate
schools for pregnant teens have dwindled in recent years because of concerns for educa-
tional equality, budget constraints, and changing social mores.”).
11 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992).
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from the law’s failure to recognize the educational equality dimensions of
the denial of reproductive rights.
II. TITLE IX: SEX EQUALITY AT THE CROSSROADS
OF PREGNANCY AND REPRODUCTION
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits sex discrimi-
nation by educational institutions that receive federal financial assistance.12
The Title IX regulations make clear that this prohibition encompasses dis-
crimination on the basis of pregnancy.13 By acknowledging that pregnancy is
a site of educational inequality and that remedying pregnancy discrimination
is necessary in order to secure equal opportunity for girls and women in
education, Title IX might have served as a basis for securing the rights of
girls and women to control their fertility and avoid pregnancy. Instead, the
ban on pregnancy discrimination is effectively limited to the point at which a
student’s education is already affected by pregnancy. Title IX pays very little
attention to what precedes or follows pregnancy.
Enacted in 1972, Title IX itself says nothing about pregnancy.14 Instead,
it sets down an open-ended ban on discrimination in education programs and
activities by federal funding recipients against any individual on the basis of
sex. What little discussion of pregnancy there was in congressional debates
over Title IX reflected the view that opening up educational opportunities to
women would give women sufficient reason to not become pregnant—at
least not too early or too often. As a leading sponsor of Title IX, Senator
Birch Bayh, put it, without access to equal educational opportunities, women
will have “too many babies.”15 This telling statement recognizes a tension
between motherhood and educational opportunity and reveals a belief that
opening up equal educational opportunity to girls and women will be suffi-
cient to resolve it. The statement reflects an implicit assumption that having
12 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance. . . .”).
13 34 C.F.R. § 106.40(b) (2020).
14 There was no federal law barring pregnancy discrimination when Title IX was
enacted. Two years later, the Supreme Court would hold that pregnancy discrimination is
not sex discrimination for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. Geduldig v. Aiello,
417 U.S. 484, 496–97 (1974) (upholding state disability insurance system that omitted
coverage for pregnancy-related disability on grounds that pregnancy discrimination does
not warrant heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause). Two years after that,
it would reach the same conclusion under Title VII. General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125, 145–46 (1976) (upholding employer-based disability system that omitted coverage
for pregnancy-related disability on grounds that pregnancy discrimination is not sex dis-
crimination for purposes of Title VII and therefore not an unlawful employment practice).
15 118 CONG. REC. 5812 (1972) (citing BERNICE SANDLER, THE STATUS OF WOMEN:
EMPLOYMENT AND ADMISSIONS).
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babies is a choice and that having better (and mutually exclusive) alternative
opportunities would redirect that choice.
Although Title IX itself does not explicitly address pregnancy discrimi-
nation, the federal agency to which Congress delegated authority to enforce
the statute, the precursor to the Department of Education (DOE), issued pro-
posed regulations in 1974.16 The regulations, which took effect in 1975, in-
cluded provisions explicitly covering pregnancy discrimination.17 Because
the regulation’s ban on pregnancy discrimination is an authoritative and rea-
sonable construction of the statute, it is enforceable through a private right of
action.18 The Title IX regulations state that recipients must “treat pregnancy,
childbirth, false pregnancy, termination of a pregnancy and recovery there-
from in the same manner and under the same policies as any other temporary
disability.”19 Additional provisions, described below, place specific obliga-
tions on federal funding recipients relating to coverage of health and medical
services, separate education programs for pregnant and parenting students,
and medical leave for pregnancy and childbirth. For each of these provisions,
meaningful protection kicks in only once pregnancy (or the perception of
pregnancy, evidenced by the regulation’s reference to “false pregnancy”) has
occurred. Neither the regulations nor the statute encompass meaningful
rights relating to pregnancy prevention or termination—nor any guarantee of
protection for reproductive freedom more generally.
A. Title IX’s Carve-Out of Reproductive Rights
While Title IX prohibits discrimination based on pregnancy, other as-
pects of reproduction that bear on educational equality are left out.
1. Abortion
The prospect that Title IX might be interpreted to support a woman’s
right to terminate a pregnancy was extinguished in 1987 when Congress
amended the statute to add the so-called abortion neutrality provision. This
provision was included in the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,20 which
was passed with the primary purpose of overturning the Supreme Court’s
16 39 Fed. Reg. 22228, 22236 (June 20, 1974). Health, Education, and Welfare, or
HEW, was subsequently split into the Department of Education and Health and Human
Services, with the former inheriting the Title IX responsibilities of HEW. See Department
of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, 93 Stat. 668 (1979) (codified at 20
U.S.C. §§3441-3442).
17 34 C.F.R. § 106.40(b) (2020).
18 See, e.g., Conley v. Nw. Fla. State Coll., 145 F. Supp. 3d 1073, 1076 (N.D. Fla.
2015) (considering and rejecting the argument that Title IX’s coverage of pregnancy dis-
crimination is not enforceable through a private right of action and citing supporting
authorities).
19 34 C.F.R. § 106.40(b) (2020).
20 Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 38(b) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1688 (2018)).
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decision in Grove City College v. Bell.21 This decision had drastically limited
Title IX’s scope by holding that only particular programs in receipt of federal
funding needed to comply. The abortion provision provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require or prohibit
any person, or public or private entity, to provide or pay for any
benefit or service, including the use of facilities, related to an
abortion.22
It is unclear exactly what Congress intended to accomplish with this provi-
sion or what it understood would be the implications for Title IX if this
disclaimer had not been included. One possible interpretation is that at least
some members of Congress were concerned, given the obvious connections
between women’s equality and women’s control over their reproductive
lives, that unless abortion rights were carved out of the statute, Title IX
might have implications for women’s access to, or education related to, this
and other reproductive services. The Title IX regulation defines pregnancy
discrimination to encompass “termination of a pregnancy”—which prohibits
a covered entity from punishing a student for having an abortion.23 This pro-
vision might have raised concerns that, without a statutory exemption, a uni-
versity’s student health services might have to cover or provide access to
abortion in order to comply with the statute’s general non-discrimination
mandate.
By defining pregnancy discrimination to encompass discrimination
against an individual for terminating a pregnancy, the Title IX regulation
extends some limited protections to students who have an abortion. The clear
import of the provision is that a student whose pregnancy was terminated
may not be penalized, whatever the reason for the termination, including
abortion. However, it is not clear what practical significance this provision
has since it has prompted scant attention and no case law. School officials
are unlikely to find out about a student’s abortion, as it would likely be less
visible than a pregnancy that progresses to term. And in those educational
settings where students are most likely to be penalized for having an abor-
tion, such as religious institutions where abortion is against the tenets of the
religion, the institution would likely be exempt from this provision anyway
under Title IX’s religious exemption, discussed below.24
21 465 U.S. 555, 571–72 (1984) (holding that Title IX applied only to those programs
within an educational institution that received federal financial assistance, rather than to
the institution as a whole).
22 20 U.S.C. § 1688 (2018).
23 34 C.F.R. § 106.40(b)(1) (2020). On the history behind the abortion provision, see
Kif Augustine-Adams, Religious Exemptions to Title IX, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 327, 384–87
(2016); Kathleen A. Bergin, Contraceptive Coverage Under Student Health Insurance
Plans: Title IX as a Remedy for Sex Discrimination, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 157, 177–78
(2000).
24 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681(a)(3), 1687 (2018).
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Aside from the regulation’s ban on punitive measures against a student
for terminating a pregnancy, Title IX creates no rights with respect to abor-
tion. The statutory amendment makes clear that Title IX does not require
educational institutions to provide any support for students seeking or hav-
ing an abortion, such as referrals to abortion providers, education about
abortion as an option, or access to abortion care as part of a student health
services plan.25
2. Contraception
Contraceptive access and support for pregnancy prevention also appear
to be outside of the statute’s protections, although, unlike abortion, no statu-
tory provision explicitly says so. To be sure, plausible arguments exist that,
since only the female reproductive system can sustain pregnancy, restric-
tions on support for contraception constitute sex discrimination against wo-
men.26 At least for educational institutions that provide basic student health
services, the omission of contraceptive care might be thought to discriminate
against women. The Title IX regulations, after all, require that federal fund-
ing recipients offering full-coverage health services must include “gyneco-
logical care” among the range of health services provided.27 Regulations
specifically prohibit sex discrimination in the administration of a university-
sponsored health or medical “benefit, service, policy or plan.”28 These regu-
lations, along with the statute’s broad ban on sex discrimination, might be
understood to impose obligations on school health services with respect to
contraception. One law journal article published two decades ago argues that
Title IX requires parity in contraceptive coverage, such that access to contra-
ception is at least equivalent to the availability of other prescription drugs.29
At that time, long before the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the
author pointed out that the vast majority of university student health insur-
ance plans denied or substantially limited contraceptive coverage.30
The argument that restricting coverage of contraceptives in student
health services violates Title IX closely tracks similar arguments under Title
VII, that employer-provided insurance that treats prescription contraception
less favorably than other prescription drugs violates the statute. Although
25 California is the first state to require public colleges and universities in the state to
provide medication abortion, a method that can be used until the tenth week of gestation,
on campuses. See Melody Gutierrez, Abortion Medication to Be Available at California’s
College Health Centers Under New Law, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2019, 1:44 PM), https://
www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-10-11/abortion-medication-california-college-
health-centers-legislation [https://perma.cc/SW96-622R].
26 See infra text accompanying notes 193-96. The fact that trans men can also be-
come pregnant does not undermine the sex discrimination argument for reproductive
rights, nor lessen the connection between women’s equality and contraceptive access.
27 34 C.F.R. § 106.39 (2020).
28 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.39–.40 (2020).
29 Bergin, supra note 23. R
30 Id. at 171–72.
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some federal district courts have been receptive to the Title VII argument,
the only circuit court to address the argument found in favor of the em-
ployer, holding that denying contraceptive coverage to all employees did not
discriminate against women.31 Although the decision has been widely criti-
cized, it took the ACA to impose contraceptive equity on employers.32 Title
IX is not likely to be interpreted more robustly than Title VII on this front,
particularly since student health plans tend to be more bare bones in terms of
coverage than employer health plans.33
Disparate impact theory, which permits challenges to neutral practices
that result in a disparate impact against a protected group, might be a viable
way of challenging contraceptive inequity under Title VII. But the disparate
impact theory is itself on shaky ground under Title IX after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, at least as a basis for private
lawsuits.34 Whether grounded in disparate impact or disparate treatment tied
to female reproductive capacity, arguments that Title IX requires contracep-
tive equity or access have not been embraced by courts or the Office of Civil
Rights (OCR).
3. Sex Education
Sex education, including education about pregnancy prevention, also
lies outside the scope of Title IX. The Title IX regulations generally exempt
curricular materials from Title IX coverage.35 Neither gender bias in what is
taught nor decisions about what to include in the curriculum are governed by
Title IX, apparently out of concern that such intrusions into curricular mat-
ters would implicate academic freedom and, in the case of public schools,
the First Amendment.36 As a result, Title IX has been of no help in challeng-
31 Standridge v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 479 F.3d 936, 944–45 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding
that the exclusion of coverage for prescription contraceptives from an employer-based
health plan does not violate Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination, in part because the plan
also omitted coverage for condoms and male sterilization). District courts were split on
this issue. Compare Stocking v. AT&T Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1017 (W.D. Mo.
2006) (Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, requires that contra-
ceptives be included in comprehensive insurance plan), and Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co.,
141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1272 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (exclusion of contraceptives from other-
wise comprehensive insurance plan constitutes sex discrimination), with Cummins v. Illi-
nois State, No. 2002-cv-4201-JPG, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42634, at *14–15 (S.D. Ill.
Aug. 30, 2005) (PDA does not require coverage).
32 See infra text accompanying notes 197-208.
33 Jimmy Gao, Student Health Insurance Hinges Upon Obamacare’s Fate, WASH.
EXAMINER, Feb. 10, 2018, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/student-health-insur
ance-hinges-upon-obamacares-fate.
34 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (holding no private right of action exists under Title VI to
enforce disparate impact regulations).
35 34 C.F.R. § 106.42 (2020) (“Nothing in this regulation shall be interpreted as re-
quiring or prohibiting or abridging in any way the use of particular textbooks or curricu-
lar materials.”).
36 See MYRA SADKER FOUND., WHAT IS TITLE IX?, https://www.sadker.org/TitleIX
.html [https://perma.cc/D4LV-UU9Z].
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ing abstinence-only education as the model of sex education taught in many
schools. Such programs are frequently taught in schools despite having abys-
mal records of preventing unwanted pregnancy, protecting sexual health, and
providing a foundation for healthy relationships.37 A large-scale analysis
showed that states requiring abstinence-only sex education in public schools
have significantly higher rates of teen pregnancy than states with compre-
hensive sex education.38 Other studies have showed other deleterious effects
of abstinence-only education, including higher rates of sexually transmitted
infections and misinformation about sexual health.39 Importantly, not one
study has showed that abstinence-only education causes teens to delay sex-
ual activity, the primary justification for the programs in the first place.40
Moreover, legal scholars have pointed out that these programs are rife with
gender stereotyping;41 the curricula largely presume women to be naturally
less driven by sexual desire and hold women responsible for controlling
male sexuality.42 Cornelia Pillard argues that abstinence-only curricula not
only propagate gendered messages about sexuality, holding up women as the
gatekeepers of chastity while normalizing male sexual aggression, but they
also implicitly promote long-term gender role segregation. Pillard argues:
A decision to practice abstinence until marriage assumes early,
heterosexual marriage and early childbearing. The expectation is
not that marriage will be delayed until a person’s late twenties or
early thirties so that both parents can complete higher education
and establish themselves at work, but that couples will marry
young and the woman will become a family caretaker, principally
37 See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Our Other Reproductive Choices: Equality in Sex Edu-
cation, Contraceptive Access, and Work-Family Policy, 56 EMORY L.J. 941, 947–48
(2007).
38 See Kathrin F. Stanger-Hall & David W. Hall, Abstinence-Only Education and
Teen Pregnancy Rates: Why We Need Comprehensive Sex Education in the U.S., 6 PLOS
ONE 1371, at 1, 6 (2011).
39 See, e.g., Hannah Bruckner & Peter Bearman, After the Promise: The STD Conse-
quences of Adolescent Virginity Pledges, 36 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 271, 277 (2005)
(concluding that students who take virginity pledges delay sexual activity slightly but
then use condoms less frequently the first time they have intercourse and are more likely
to contract a sexually transmitted infection); Hannah Bruckner & Peter Bearman, Promis-
ing the Future: Virginity Pledges and First Intercourse, 106 AM. J. SOC. 859, 900 (2001)
(exploring the effects of virginity pledges, which delay sexual activity only among
younger adolescents and only if relatively few people take the pledge); Julie F. Kay,




40 See John Santelli et al., Abstinence-Only Until Marriage: An Updated Review of
U.S. Policies and Programs and Their Impact, 61 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 273, 277, 278
(2017).
41 Id.
42 See Danielle LeClair, Let’s Talk About Sex Honestly: Why Federal Abstinence-
Only-Until-Marriage Education Programs Discriminate Against Girls, Are Bad Public
Policy, and Should Be Overturned, 21 WISC. WOMEN’S L.J. 291, 302–03 (2006).
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supported by her husband, who remains relatively free of care-
giving duties to pursue his career.43
This messaging stands in stark contrast to the policies underlying Title IX,
which seek to ensure that women have all of the educational opportunities
available to men for professional advancement. And yet, due to Title IX’s
omission of curricular coverage and teaching materials, the statute has no
application to such programs.44 With no legal footprint in Title IX, absti-
nence-only policies typically spark debate about their effectiveness in
preventing unwanted pregnancies, but rarely about their consequences for
equal educational opportunity for girls and women.
4. Sexual Assault and Pregnancy
One area that is governed by Title IX and that does have implications
for protecting women’s reproductive autonomy is the law’s requirement that
educational institutions respond to sexual assault. Title IX has long covered
sexual assault as part of the statute’s prohibition against sexual harassment—
an understanding that was solidified through judicial interpretation and clari-
fied through a series of guidance documents by the Department of Educa-
tion.45 Title IX enforcement against inadequate campus responses to sexual
assault was ramped up under the Obama Administration but rolled back
when the Trump Administration took the reins over the Department of Edu-
cation. In November of 2018, the Trump Administration released a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking.46 The notice announced proposed revisions to the Ti-
tle IX regulations. If adopted, the new regulations would severely cut back
on the obligations Title IX places on schools to respond to sexual assault,
and drastically curtail the underlying conduct that triggers Title IX obliga-
tions.47 For example, the proposed regulations would leave unregulated sex-
ual assaults that take place off-campus even if the assaults involve students
and student associations, such as fraternities, and even if they affect a survi-
vor’s ability to attend classes and complete her education.48 The proposed
regulations were the subject of a public notice and comment period that en-
ded in January of 2019,49 and it remains to be seen whether and in what form
the Trump DOE will issue final regulations that change the governing stan-
43 Pillard, supra note 37, at 954. R
44 Although one student note argues that abstinence-only programs violate Title IX
because they fail to adequately address issues that disproportionately affect girls, such as
unwanted pregnancy and STIs, the argument fails to consider the Title IX regulation’s
exemption of curricular materials. LeClair, supra note 42, at 316. R
45 See Deborah L. Brake, Back to Basics: Excavating the Sex Discrimination Roots of
Campus Sexual Assault, 6 TENN. J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. J. 7, 21 (2017).
46 U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462 (Nov.
29, 2018) (describing the new proposals under the Trump administration).
47 Id.
48 See id.
49 83 Fed. Reg. 61462 (Nov. 29, 2018).
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dards for schools. Curtailing institutional obligations under Title IX for re-
sponding to sexual assault will erode the legal culture that pressed colleges
and universities to take a more proactive approach to sexual assault under
the Obama Administration.50
Even the Obama-era Title IX enforcement was insufficient to curb the
underlying problem of sexual assault and sexual coercion among students. A
2019 American Association of Universities (AAU) study, which updated
findings from its 2016 study, found that the prevalence of actual and at-
tempted sexual assault on campuses remains as high as ever and, at some
institutions, increased in the intervening years.51 Of course, not all of these
numbers represent sexual intercourse with an attendant risk of pregnancy.
But the estimates for such conduct remain alarmingly significant. Some sex-
ual assaults will result in unwanted pregnancy. According to the best availa-
ble estimates, around five percent of all rapes result in pregnancy.52 The Title
IX framework, focused as it is on institutional responses to sexual assault
after the fact, has done little to protect women from the risk of unwanted sex
that may lead to pregnancy.53
In addition to the gap between responding to sexual assault after the
fact and preventing it in the first place, another limitation on Title IX’s abil-
ity to deter sexual activity resulting in unwanted pregnancy is in the defini-
tion of the sexual conduct that Title IX covers. Robin West observes that
there is a category of sexual conduct that the law leaves unregulated but
which is equally harmful in terms of costs to women’s equality and agency:
sex that is consensual but not desired.54 Title IX does not—and likely can-
not—deter such sexual conduct, nor does it create conditions on campus for
sexual equality between men and women in acting on sexual desire.
Perhaps the biggest flaw in the Title IX framework in terms of its im-
pact on women’s reproductive control is that it considers only the un-
welcomeness of the sexual contact itself and not of the reproductive
consequences of sexual intimacy. Sexual contact that is welcome but that
involves reproductive coercion is not addressed by the case law or OCR
guidance documents. Even the Obama Administration’s guidance documents
did not consider the case of a male sexual partner coercing a female partner
50 For more details and context surrounding the proposed changes, see Joanna L.
Grossman & Deborah L. Brake, A Sharp Backward Turn: Department of Education Pro-
poses to Undermine Protections for Students Against Sexual Harassment and Assault,
JUSTIA’S VERDICT (Nov. 27, 2018), https://verdict.justia.com/2018/11/27/a-sharp-back-
ward-turn-department-of-education-proposes-to-undermine-protections-for-students-
against-sexual-harassment-and-assault [https://perma.cc/6WEG-4638].
51 ASS’N AM. UNIV., AAU CAMPUS CLIMATE SURVEY vii (2019), https://www.aau
.edu/key-issues/campus-climate-and-safety/aau-campus-climate-survey-2019 [https://per
ma.cc/4HMX-CHRZ].
52 Francesca Cocuzza, supra note 2, at 219.
53 Katherine Silbaugh, Reactive to Proactive: Title IX’s Unrealized Capacity to Pre-
vent Campus Sexual Assault, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (2015).
54 Robin West, Consensual Sexual Dysphoria: A Challenge for Campus Life, 66 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 804, 806 (2017).
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into unprotected sex and a risk of pregnancy, as long as the sex itself was
consensual. A male partner who removes a condom during sex against his
female partner’s wishes or pressures a female partner into not using contra-
ception, engages in reproductive coercion, even if the sexual contact itself is
consensual. Recent studies have documented high prevalence rates of repro-
ductive coercion among school-age sexual partners, with approximately one
in eight sexually active high school girls reporting having experienced repro-
ductive coercion by a male partner.55 A recent study by University of Pitts-
burgh researchers found that African American and Latina young women
experience reproductive coercion in sexual relationships at particularly high
rates.56 Several legal scholars have recently argued for legal recognition of
reproductive coercion as a violation of sex equality principles.57 To date,
however, Title IX has not been applied to address reproductive coercion as a
form of sexual assault.
A final limitation of the Title IX framework regulating sexual assault
lies in the remedies Title IX extends to sexual assault survivors, even when
the underlying sexual conduct is within the boundaries of Title IX’s scope.
Title IX does not require campus services for sexual assault survivors to
provide emergency contraception to prevent unwanted pregnancy resulting
from nonconsensual sex, nor access to abortion education, referrals or ser-
vices if unwanted pregnancy does result. Even the Obama DOE Title IX
guidance documents (which the Trump Administration has now rescinded)
stopped short of recognizing pregnancy as a harm resulting from sexual as-
sault for which schools have an obligation to provide a remedy.58 As a result,
survivors of sexual assault may be unable to access emergency contraception
through campus health services or to access it off campus on a timely basis,
interfering with their ability to prevent pregnancy.59
* * *
This survey of the gaps in Title IX relating to women’s control over
their reproductive lives reveals an overarching theme: Title IX has little or
55 Gwen Aviles & Rosa Guevara, Latina and Black Adolescents May Be More Vul-
nerable to Reproductive Coercion, NBC NEWS (July 24, 2019, 9:59 AM), https://www
.nbcnews.com/news/latino/latina-black-adolescents-may-be-more-vulnerable-reproduc-
tive-coercion-n1031711 [https://perma.cc/4L95-FLDX].
56 Amber L. Hill et al., Reproductive Coercion and Relationship Abuse Among Ado-
lescents and Young Women Seeking Care at School Health Centers, 134 OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 351, 353 (2019).
57 See Alexandra Brodsky, Rape-Adjacent: Imagining Legal Responses to Noncon-
sensual Condom Removal, 32 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 183 (2017); Rachel Camp, Coerc-
ing Pregnancy, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 275 (2015); Leah Plunkett,
Contraceptive Sabotage, 28 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 97 (2014).
58 See Cocuzza, supra note 2, at 212 (arguing that Title IX should recognize preg-
nancy as a harm to be remedied when it results from sexual assault).
59 Id.
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no applicability to pregnancy prevention or termination. The constraints lim-
iting women’s control over their reproductive lives are not the subject of
Title IX’s promise of equal educational opportunity for girls and women.
Title IX’s protection from discrimination on the basis of pregnancy kicks in
only once pregnancy is a fait accompli. The following section examines the
scope and limitations of Title IX’s framework of rights for pregnant and
parenting students.
B. Title IX’s Protection from Discrimination Against Pregnant
and Parenting Students
Unlike pregnancy prevention or termination, which are not encom-
passed by the educational equality that Title IX promises, students’
pregnancies are the subject of Title IX rights.
Title IX’s prohibition on pregnancy discrimination creates an important
set of rights that delineate a baseline of educational opportunity to which
pregnant students are entitled. Even here, however, these rights are insuffi-
cient to fully protect students from having their educational careers derailed
by pregnancy and motherhood.
1. The Social Construction of the Pregnant Subject of Title IX
Rights
The history of social policy surrounding teen pregnancy is an important
starting point in understanding the need for and limitations of Title IX rights
for pregnant students. Gender and education scholar Wanda Pillow has
traced the history of how teen pregnancy has been socially constructed as an
educational “problem” and how the prototype of the pregnant teen and teen
mother has shifted over time, shaped by changing racial and class-based as-
sumptions and biases.60 Pillow argues that the pregnant teen whom legisla-
tors and regulators sought to protect in passing Title IX in 1972 was
implicitly an otherwise virtuous young white woman who made a mistake
and deserved a second chance.61 That prototype of the pregnant teen, who
typically gave up her child for adoption and returned to school with no (visi-
ble) marker of motherhood, transformed in the 1980s and 1990s, with the
rise of welfare mother discourses and racialized concerns about urban
60 Wanda S. Pillow, Embodying Policy Studies: Feminist Geneaology as Methodol-
ogy, in EDUCATION POLICY AND CONTEMPORARY THEORY: IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH
134, 137–38 (Kalervo N. Gulson et al. eds., 2015). For a comprehensive analysis of how
discourses surrounding pregnant teens and teen mothers affect educational policy, see
WANDA S. PILLOW, UNFIT SUBJECTS: EDUCATION POLICY AND THE TEEN MOTHER,
1972–2002 (2004).
61 See PILLOW, UNFIT SUBJECTS, supra note 60, at 22 (2004). During the 1950s and R
1960s, pregnant teens were often whisked away to homes for unwed mothers, where their
pregnancy could progress in secret, and their babies could be surrendered (in some cases
involuntarily) for adoption. See ANN FESSLER, THE GIRLS WHO WENT AWAY (2006).
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crime.62 Along with this change in the discourse and underlying assumptions
about the problem of teen pregnancy, the imagined subject of Title IX rights
became racialized and less sympathetic. The prototype of the pregnant teen
subject morphed from white to black or white to Latina, with notable shifts
in how policy-makers and educators responded to the “problem” of teen
pregnancy.63
As evidence of this shift, Pillow points to literature promoting non-
profit, charitable homes for pregnant girls in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century; pictures depict middle class white girls and their babies in
a sympathetic light.64 By contrast, a very different image of teen motherhood
emerged in a high-profile 2013 New York City subway public education
“shaming” campaign meant to deter teen pregnancy. On bus and subway
billboards, teen mothers were “depicted clearly racialized (brown, bi-racial,
black),” holding crying, distressed babies, alongside guilt-inducing phrases
through which the babies rebuked their mothers for having them too young
and hurting their educational and life chances.65 The teen mother depicted in
this public education campaign was someone who selfishly and irresponsibly
hurt society and her own child and implicitly has little claim to opportunities
for herself.
As explained below, Title IX constrains how educational institutions
are permitted to respond to pregnancy and motherhood. The legal framework
is premised on an (implicitly white) presumptively deserving educational
subject, Pillow argues, even as policymakers and educators have over time
presumed pregnant teens and teen mothers (implicitly black and Latina) to
be underserving, educationally deficient failures to be mitigated. Pillow con-
tends that the social construction of the pregnant teen and teen mother as a
rights-bearing subject has undercut the effectiveness of the legal framework:
“Title IX has not been effective at encouraging schools to implement the
language of Title IX to the fullest extent nor has Title IX been able to sepa-
rate entrenched social beliefs about teen mothers from the educational rights
of these students.”66
2. The Title IX Regulations and Rights of Pregnant and Parenting
Students
Indeed, assumptions about the educational potential of the Title IX sub-
ject underpin both the substantive interpretation of Title IX rights and their
enforcement. The limited obligations Title IX places on schools treat the
pregnant subject as a problem to be managed and do not require the kind of
long-term supports necessary for educational success. Title IX treats preg-
62 Pillow, UNFIT SUBJECTS, supra note 60, at 33-50. R
63 Id.
64 Id. at 20–26.
65 Pillow, Embodying Policy Studies, supra note 60, at 142. R
66 Id. at 140.
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nancy as, at most, a temporary physical impairment in relation to education
that requires limited accommodation. For the most part, accommodations for
pregnant students are guaranteed only to the same extent as provided for
students with temporary disabilities.67 In the one area in which the Title IX
framework extends beyond equal treatment and into the substantive equality
realm of affirmative accommodation mandates, the specific accommodations
required are tied to the student’s physical condition only and do nothing to
ease the educational impacts of motherhood.68 Even this limited set of rights
is structurally designed such that under-enforcement and a lack of knowl-
edge of Title IX are rampant.
The starting point in Title IX’s framework of rights for pregnant stu-
dents is that pregnancy can no longer be a flashpoint for pushing students
out of school or educational activities. The Title IX regulations state that “A
recipient shall not discriminate against any student, or exclude any student
from its education program or activity, including any class or extracurricular
activity, on the basis of such student’s pregnancy . . . unless the student
requests voluntarily to participate in a separate portion of the program or
activity. . . .”69 The significance of this prohibition should not be under-
stated, as it marks an important departure from the pre-Title IX era in which
pregnant students were commonly excluded from school entirely or confined
to separate schools for pregnant (or otherwise delinquent) girls on the theory
that pregnancy was a contagion that might spread if other students were
exposed to it.70 Title IX put an end to such blatantly exclusionary school
push-out policies for pregnant girls.
Title IX’s ban on excluding students from school on the basis of preg-
nancy is not limited to formal policies; it may also capture more subtle ex-
clusionary practices. A Title IX violation may be established by evidence
that pregnancy was the real, if undisclosed, reason for a student’s dismissal
from an education program. In Varlesi v. Wayne State University,71 for exam-
ple, a master’s student in the School of Social Work alleged that she was
terminated by her field placement supervisor because of her pregnancy.
When she received a failing grade and was dismissed from the program, she
sued, claiming that the university’s asserted reason, poor performance, was a
pretext for pregnancy discrimination.72 The court denied the employer sum-
mary judgment based on the evidence that the plaintiff was doing a good job
otherwise and that her failing grade was because her supervisor disapproved
of her pregnancy.73 The case went to trial and the jury awarded the plaintiff
67 34 C.F.R. § 106.40(b) (2020).
68 Id.
69 34 C.F.R. § 106.40(b)(1) (2020).
70 Kendra Fershee, Hollow Promises for Pregnant Students: How the Regulations
Governing Title IX Fail to Prevent Pregnancy Discrimination in School, 43 IND. L. REV.
79, 82 (2009).
71 909 F. Supp. 2d 827 (E.D. Mich. 2012).
72 Id. at 851.
73 Id. at 853–54.
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nearly $850,000 in damages.74 However, in other cases, plaintiffs have failed
to convince the court that the reason for termination from an education pro-
gram was pregnancy discrimination, as opposed to poor academic
performance.75
Title IX’s prohibition on excluding students on the basis of pregnancy
applies to all school programs, including extracurricular activities such as
athletics. Title IX permits educators to require pregnant students to provide a
doctor’s note certifying their ability to participate, but only on the same
terms that they require for students with other medical conditions.76 Pregnant
students may not be forced out of any education program for as long as their
doctor verifies their ability to continue to participate.77 In 2007, OCR issued
a Dear Colleague letter reminding recipients of this obligation in response to
media reports of student athletes who became pregnant and then had their
athletic scholarships revoked.78 Athletes who become pregnant have the right
to stay on the team for as long as their doctor permits and to take a medically
necessary leave from the team when needed, with the right to reinstatement
at the same status as when the leave began.79 For scholarship athletes, this
status encompasses retention of athletic scholarships.80 Because athletic pro-
grams routinely keep “red-shirted” injured athletes on scholarship, Title IX’s
equal treatment guarantee requires no less for athletes who are pregnant or
recovering from pregnancy.81
3. Pregnancy as a Trigger for Penalizing Sexual Activity
Although stated in absolute terms, the ban on excluding students from
education programs on the basis of pregnancy is not as all-encompassing as
it first appears. While pregnancy itself may not serve as the basis for exclu-
sion, the conduct that leads to pregnancy—sexual activity—may, as long as it
is the subject of a gender-neutral proscription. A handful of cases challeng-
74 Jill Lubas, WSU Student Wins Suit, S. END WEEKLY (Feb. 18, 2013), https://www
.thesouthend.wayne.edu/archives/article_3445bc5d-0648-59eb-9740-7eeb88b630c7.html
[https://perma.cc/MTR6-2N4M].
75 See, e.g., Workman v. Univ. of Akron, No. 5:16-cv-156, 2017 WL 6326898, at *4
(N.D. Ohio 2017) (granting defendant summary judgment where plaintiff failed to prove
that her failures in the program were due to bias against her pregnancy as opposed to her
failure to complete program requirements); McConaughy v. Univ. of Cincinnati, No.
1:08-cv-320, 2011 WL 1459292, at *9 (S.D. Ohio 2011) (granting summary judgment to
defendant where plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimina-
tion because her academic performance was not satisfactory).
76 34 C.F.R. § 106.40(b)(1)–(2) (2020).
77 Id.




80 See Deborah L. Brake, The Invisible Pregnant Athlete and the Promise of Title IX,
31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 323, 329 (2008).
81 Id. at 329–30.
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ing the exclusion of pregnant students from the National Honor Society, read
together, draw this distinction. Four reported cases involve Title IX chal-
lenges to the exclusion of pregnant students from membership in their
school’s chapter of the National Honor Society.82 Plaintiffs succeeded in
proving likely or actual Title IX violations in three of them, and won a par-
tial, but ultimately limited, victory in the fourth by overturning a grant of
summary judgment. Although these odds seem to favor plaintiffs, the princi-
ples and distinctions drawn by the cases are more nuanced. The guiding
principle is that schools may not punish or stigmatize pregnancy per se, but
they may punish the sexual activity that results in pregnancy, as long as they
do so on formally gender-neutral terms that they apply to men and women
alike.
The precedent that most clearly inscribes this line is the Third Circuit’s
decision in Pfeiffer v. Marion Center Area School District, where the court
upheld the district court’s finding that the plaintiff “was dismissed because
of premarital sexual activity and not because of gender discrimination.”83
The court nevertheless reversed summary judgment and remanded to the dis-
trict court on the narrow ground that the lower court had erroneously ex-
cluded evidence that a former male student who had impregnated his
girlfriend was not barred from membership in the National Honor Society.84
Even so, the court hedged on whether such evidence would necessitate a
different result, even as the court opened the door to the possibility that
applying different rules to boys and girls regarding their involvement in sex-
ual activity would violate Title IX.85
Although Pfeiffer at first blush appears to be an outlier in this grouping
of cases, on further study, even the three more clear-cut victories for plain-
tiffs are narrower than they may first appear. In the earliest of these chal-
lenges, Wort v. Vierling, the plaintiff won a bench trial and was reinstated as
a member of the National Honor Society, but without a reported decision.86
The appeal in the Seventh Circuit was on the issue of attorney’s fees only
and not on the merits.87 In Pfeiffer, the Third Circuit dismissed Wort as pre-
cedent on the ground that the court had “declined to distinguish the sexual
conduct from the resulting pregnancy,” while the lower court in Pfeiffer
found that the plaintiff “was dismissed not because she was pregnant but
because she had engaged in premarital activity.”88 That reasoning makes it
82 Cazares v. Barber, 959 F.2d 753, 755 (9th Cir. 1992); Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area
Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779, 780 (3d Cir. 1990); Wort v. Vierling. 778 F.2d 1233, 1233 (7th
Cir. 1985); Chipman v. Grant Cty. Sch. Dist. 30 F. Supp. 2d 975, 977 (E.D. Ky. 1998).
83 Pfeiffer, 917 F.2d at 780.
84 Id. at 783.
85 Id. at 781 (“[W]e do not suggest that the admission of this evidence would, in and
of itself, produce a different result from that previously reached by the trial court.”).
86 Wort, 778 F.2d at 1233.
87 Id.
88 Pfeiffer, 917 F.2d at 784.
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difficult to read Wort as a rejection of Pfeiffer’s separation of pregnancy
from the sexual conduct that precedes pregnancy.
A case decided soon after Pfeiffer, Cazares v. Barber,89 is also consis-
tent with, and further reinforces, the distinction between pregnancy and sex-
ual activity. In that case, the district court found that the school’s denial of
National Honor Society membership to the plaintiff because she was preg-
nant, unmarried, and living with the father violated Title IX.90 However, the
lower court also pointedly noted that a male student who had fathered a child
out of wedlock and who did not live with the mother was accepted as a
National Honor Society member.91 The court’s recitation of that fact appears
to embrace, rather than reject, the distinction between sexual activity and
pregnancy drawn in Pfeiffer. And, in a hollow victory, the school decided to
cancel their participation in the honor society rather than induct the
plaintiff.92
The most recent case challenging the exclusion of pregnant students
from the National Honor Society, Chipman v. Grant County School District,
appears to rebuke the Pfeiffer court’s reasoning.93 It is also, however, less of
a break with Pfeiffer than it first appears. The court’s opinion begins by
pointing out that the sexual conduct of the two excluded pregnant students
came to the attention of school authorities only because of their
pregnancies.94 The court credited the school’s evidence that the selection
committee “would have considered any evidence of paternity in evaluating
the character of male students,” but noted that “it was unlikely that any such
knowledge would come before the committee in any way but rumor and
gossip.”95 The court then summarized the three cases above and expressed
agreement with Wort and Cazares and disagreement with Pfeiffer.96 The
court granted the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction enjoining their exclusion
from the National Honor Society, concluding that the plaintiffs were likely
to succeed on the merits of the Title IX claim under either a disparate treat-
ment or disparate impact theory of discrimination.97 However, the preceden-
tial force of this ruling as a rejection of Pfeiffer’s distinction between
pregnancy and sexual activity is undercut by the court’s heavy reliance on a
disparate impact analysis, rather than disparate treatment, in evaluating the
likelihood of the plaintiffs’ success on the merits. Analogizing to the availa-
89 959 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1992).
90 Id. at 755.
91 See Deborah L. Brake, When Equality Leaves Everyone Worse Off: The Problem of
Leveling Down in Equality Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 517 n.14 (2004) (discuss-
ing Cazares v. Barber, No. CIV-90-0128-TUC-ACM (D. Ariz. May 31, 1990)).
92 Cazares, 959 F.2d at 755; see also Brake, supra note 91, at 518 (discussing and R
criticizing this decision as a form of leveling down).
93 30 F. Supp. 2d 975 (E.D. Ky. 1998).
94 Id. at 977.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 978.
97 Id. at 979–980.
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bility of disparate impact claims under Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation Act, the court concluded that disparate impact claims for pregnancy
discrimination should likewise be cognizable under Title IX. The court de-
scribed the relevant proof as follows:
Although 100% of young women who are visibly pregnant or who
have had a child out of wedlock are denied membership, as far as
the record reflects, defendants’ policy excludes 0% of young men
who have had premarital sexual relations and 0% of young women
who have had such relations but have not become pregnant or have
elected to have an early abortion.98
Finding that the school had “many alternate means to assess the character of
candidates,” the court concluded that the defendants failed to meet their bur-
den to prove that the policy was reasonably necessary to serve its educa-
tional purposes.99 Turning to a disparate treatment analysis, the court ruled
that the defendants failed to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for excluding the plaintiffs, describing their articulated reasons as “vague,
conclusory and undocumented.”100 The tenor of the decision is certainly a
win for pregnant students and, on its face, a refusal to distinguish rules pun-
ishing pregnancy from rules punishing sexual activity. However, the prece-
dential value of the case, insofar as it rejects a distinction between pregnancy
and sexual activity, is limited by the court’s reliance on a disparate impact
analysis (which, as discussed below, subsequent developments have ren-
dered less viable under Title IX) and by the paucity of the record before the
court. Had the school more convincingly demonstrated a policy of excluding
students for nonmarital sexual activity, it may have been more successful in
defending against a disparate treatment claim.
The fact that courts can credibly distinguish excluding a student be-
cause of pregnancy from excluding a student for having engaged in sexual
intercourse underscores Title IX’s sharp divide in protecting pregnancy from
punishment but excising the conduct leading to pregnancy from that protec-
tion. The courts’ distinction between pregnancy and sexual activity also casts
into sharp relief the fragility of Title IX’s protection from pregnancy discrim-
ination. If students can be punished for having engaged in sexual activity, as
long as they are subjected to formally gender-neutral rules, pregnant students
will always suffer more than non-pregnant, sexually active students (a group
that includes all sexually active male students) for the obvious reason that
their pregnancy, at some point, makes their past sexual activity visible.
An example from the higher education setting of how distinguishing
sexual activity from pregnancy undercuts Title IX’s protection from preg-
98 Id. at 979.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 980.
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nancy discrimination can be found in Hall v. Lee College, Inc.101 Lee Col-
lege, a private religious college, suspended Melissa Hall after she became
pregnant for violating its student code of conduct rules on sexual activity.102
The court held that because the college’s ban on “sexual immorality” ap-
plied to men as well as women and because Hall could not point to any
similarly situated male students who were not disciplined under the policy,
she failed to prove that the college discriminated in violation of Title IX.103 It
would not have been surprising if Hall was unable to point to a similarly
situated male student, since there is no visible marker of male sexual con-
duct akin to pregnancy. In fact, however, Hall did identify a male compara-
tor who impregnated his girlfriend but was not suspended.104 The court
rejected the male student as a comparator on the ground that he married his
pregnant girlfriend, which cured the immorality in the eyes of the college.105
The court did not address the fact that the college offered him, but not Hall,
the option to marry the sexual partner and avoid suspension. In addition to
the marital difference between Hall and the male comparator, the court also
noted that the male comparator had a close familial relationship with the
college president, which rendered him dissimilar to Hall for that reason as
well.106 Importantly, the court’s ruling was that the college did not discrimi-
nate against Hall on the basis of pregnancy.107 The court did not address the
religious exemption to Title IX or the school’s noncompliance with the statu-
tory requirement that religious institutions submit a written request for the
exemption to the Department of Education.108 As a result, the precedential
value of the case is not limited to religious institutions. Instead, the court’s
decision illustrates how, despite Title IX’s ban on excluding students from
educational programs on the basis of pregnancy, the statute’s separation of
pregnancy from sexual activity limits the scope of its pregnancy discrimina-
tion ban.
Although the religious exemption was not needed for the court to side
with the college in Hall, Title IX’s exemption for religious institutions does
significantly limit Title IX’s protection of pregnant students, even for the
regulation’s strongest provision barring their exclusion. Since its enactment,
Title IX has provided an “out” for religious institutions to seek an exemp-
tion from the law when compliance with the statute or regulations would be
inconsistent with the religious tenets of the institution.109 The Department of
Education grants religious exemptions without issuing public notices or
opinions, making it difficult to track exemptions. But by all indications, the
101 932 F. Supp. 1027 (E.D. Tenn. 1996).
102 Id. at 1030.
103 Id. at 1031, 1033.
104 Id. at 1031–32.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 1033.
108 Id.
109 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3) (2020).
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Department freely grants religious exemptions without much scrutiny, espe-
cially of late.110 Pregnancy was a focal point behind the religious exemption
and a primary concern of Congress in including it in the bill.111 Institutions
with religious affiliations will likely be successful in lifting Title IX’s obliga-
tions with respect to pregnancy whenever they can plausibly claim a conflict
with their religious precepts. By asserting religious views against premarital
sexual activity, an institution could penalize virtually all pregnant students,
and few or no male students, for having sex outside of marriage. Undoubt-
edly, the statute’s religious exemption would also effectively exempt relig-
ious institutions from any obligations with respect to reproductive rights,
were Title IX expanded or interpreted differently to have a broader applica-
tion in that realm.112 Indeed, all of the rights discussed herein would give
way for religiously affiliated institutions that successfully invoke the relig-
ious exception to Title IX. For nonreligious institutions, however, Title IX
creates a set of rights for pregnant students beyond the ban on exclusion,
with varying levels of protection, as described below.
4. Title IX’s Accommodation and Equal Treatment Approaches to
Pregnancy
The most expansive of Title IX’s rights relating to pregnancy is the
guarantee of a reasonably necessary medical leave for pregnancy and recov-
ery therefrom, with a right to reinstatement at the same level one was em-
ployed at which when the leave began.113 This right is substantive rather than
comparative in nature because it does not depend on whether any other med-
ical conditions qualify for such a leave.114 This provision of the Title IX
regulations was the basis for the successful effort to call attention to and end
the plight of athletes who lost their athletic scholarships after becoming
pregnant—a practice that came to light when ESPN exposed it in a widely
watched episode of the show, “Outside the Lines,” that first ran on Mother’s
110 See Amanda Bryk, Title IX Giveth and Title IX Taketh Away: How the Religious
Exemption Eviscerates Protection Afforded Transgender Students Under Title IX, 37
CARDOZO L. REV. 751, 777 (2015); Cocuzza, supra note 2, at 243.
111 Cocuzza, supra note 2, at 244 n.151.
112 Cf. Elizabeth B. Deutsch, Expanding Conscience, Shrinking Care: The Crisis in
Access to Reproductive Care and the Affordable Care Act’s Nondiscrimination Mandate,
124 YALE L.J. 2470 (2015) (exploring the stakes of expanding the religious exemption in
the ACA).
113 34 CFR § 106.40(b)(5) (2020).
114 Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, pregnant employees have only a com-
parative right of accommodation; they are entitled only to those accommodations that the
employer has chosen to provide to employees with comparable disabilities from a differ-
ent source. See Young v. United Parcel Serv., 575 U.S. 206 (2015) (interpreting PDA’s
right of accommodation); see also Joanna L. Grossman & Gillian L. Thomas, Making
Pregnancy Work: Overcoming the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s Capacity-Based
Model, 21 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 15 (2009) (exploring limits of comparative right of
accommodation).
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Day of 2007.115 The 2007 OCR “Dear Colleague” letter was issued soon
after the show aired. The letter explained that institutions must grant preg-
nant athletes a medically necessary leave from sport when the athlete’s doc-
tor determined it was necessary and maintain their status as scholarship
athletes.116 Upon their return to the team, the athletes would be protected
under the equal treatment mandate, discussed below, and must be treated no
worse than athletes who return after recovery from other medical
conditions.117
Although this set of rights is very helpful for athletes who become
pregnant,118 it has had a more modest effect on other areas of educational
opportunity. Because the leave and reinstatement right accommodate only
the physical effects of pregnancy, it is less helpful in navigating the longer-
term conflicts that continue well after the student has physically recovered
from pregnancy. The accommodation right in the leave provision is a time-
limited accommodation with a short clock. While the physical effects of
pregnancy and recovery are present, a student has the implicit right to make
up the missed work so that the student may continue their education at the
same level at which the leave began. Hence, students sidelined by pregnancy
and recovery may succeed in asserting a right to finish a course or, at the
graduate level, continue with a fellowship or research opportunity.119 These
rights are no small matter for a student seeking to minimize the disruptions
due to pregnancy in her educational trajectory.120 However, the accommoda-
tion and reinstatement right ends when the physical recovery period is over
and does not require leave or opportunities to make up missed work for
absences related to the care of a newborn, such as pediatrician appointments,
breastfeeding, or other caretaking.121 As a result, despite a relatively strong
115 Brake, The Invisible Pregnant Athlete, supra note 80, at 327. R
116 Stephanie J. Monroe, supra note 78. The following year, the NCAA amended its R
scholarship rules to require member schools to treat pregnancy no worse than other inju-
ries or illnesses, which means a scholarship cannot be withdrawn based on pregnancy
alone. The new rules came with a model policy that includes other protections for preg-
nant college athletes. See NCAA, 2019–2020 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, 15.3.4.3,
15.3.2.1 Division I and II Bylaw 15, § 3.4.3; see also Bylaw 15, § 3.2.2; Nancy Hogs-
head-Makar & Elizabeth A. Sorensen, Pregnant and Parenting Student-Athletes, NCAA
GENDER EQUITY 1, 31 (2008), http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/PregnancyToolkit
.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5LD-EQN2].
117 NCAA, 2019–2020 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, 15.3.4.3, 15.3.2.1 Division I and
II Bylaw 15, § 3.4.3; see also Bylaw 15, § 3.2.2.
118 See Brake, The Invisible Pregnant Athlete, supra note 80, at 340-44. R
119 Mary Ann Mason & Jaclyn Younger, Title IX and Pregnancy Discrimination in
Higher Education: The New Frontier, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 269, 296
(2014).
120 See, e.g., Frankola v. La. St. Univ. Sch. of Med., No. 15-5933, 2017 WL 372520
(E.D. La. Jan. 26, 2017) (finding that student’s allegation that she was denied readmission
to medical school in part due to her pregnancy after taking a medical leave of absence
was sufficient to state a claim under Title IX and survived defendant’s motion to dismiss).
121 Medical professionals define the physical recovery period from normal childbirth
as six weeks for a vaginal birth and eight weeks for a Caesarean section. That period can
vary tremendously for individuals who have a complicated birth or develop postpartum
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\43-2\HLG205.txt unknown Seq: 25 23-JUN-20 16:07
2020] Reproducing Inequality Under Title IX 195
set of rights, the leave and reinstatement requirement does not prevent a
good portion of the educational disruption likely to result from pregnancy
and childbirth.
The guarantee of an absolute right of accommodation for pregnant stu-
dents is the hallmark of a “special treatment” approach to pregnancy in
which rights are designed to protect pregnant women regardless of whether
individuals with comparable temporary disabilities have the same protec-
tions.122 A downside of this approach is that it sets the stage for treating
pregnancy specially in ways that may put pregnant students at an educational
disadvantage. The Title IX regulation takes this path by allowing separate
schools and programs for pregnant and parenting students, as long as they
are offered on a “completely voluntary” basis and the instructional compo-
nent is “comparable.”123 The comparable and voluntary restrictions on sepa-
rate programs have proven difficult to enforce. To require a program to be
comparable is a low bar. Separate programs have been criticized for focus-
ing on parenting skills and “soft skills” like quilting and home economics
instead of offering a college prep curriculum.124
Although some of these programs have been discontinued due to public
pressure, none has yet been ruled by a court to be in violation of the regula-
tion’s comparability requirement.125 The closest case to do so involved the
Catherine Ferguson Academy (CFA), a separate charter school in Detroit for
pregnant and parenting students that was restructured as part of a “strict
discipline” school for delinquent youth.126 In a Title IX lawsuit brought by
students and their parents, the court issued a ruling permitting the plaintiffs
to amend their complaint to add Title IX claims, crediting the plaintiffs’ alle-
gations that the education offered by CFA was inferior and contrary to the
Title IX regulations.127 The inequalities in that case were extreme, as the
school lacked even basic courses needed to graduate from high school.128
conditions. See Mattea Romano, Postpartum Period: Three Distinct but Continuous
Phases,4 J. Prenatal Med. 22 (2010); cf. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S.
272, 290 (1987) (holding under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act that the right of ac-
commodation extends only to “the period of actual physical disability on account of
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions”).
122 On the longstanding debate among women’s rights advocates about whether this is
the right approach, see Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal
Citizenship, 98 GEO. L.J. 567, 603–05 (2010); Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference:
The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (1985); Wendy W. Williams, The
Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L.
REP. 175 (1982).
123 34 C.F.R. § 106.40(b)(3) (2020).
124 Monica J. Stamm, A Skeleton in the Closet: Single-Sex Schools for Pregnant
Girls, COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1218 (1998). Julie Bosman, Schools for Pregnant Girls,
Relic of 1960s New York, Will Close, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2007), https://www.nytimes
.com/2007/05/24/education/24educ.html [https://perma.cc/LL9A-ZU7E]
125 Stamm, supra note 124, at 1218; Bosman, supra note 124. R
126 D.W. ex rel Crosby v. Blanche Kelso Bruce Acad., No. 13-12415, 2013 WL
5819619, at *1–2 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2013).
127 Id. at *5.
128 Id. at *1.
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CFA closed one year after the court’s ruling, but a new charter school, Path-
ways Academy, opened to serve pregnant and parenting students in the De-
troit school district.129 It was identified as a low-performing school by the
Michigan Department of Education in 2018.130 The Title IX regulation’s al-
lowance of separate, academically diluted programs for pregnant and parent-
ing students reflects the mentality of just get her through, prioritizing a
lower school drop-out rate over other more ambitious educational objectives.
Like the comparability requirement, the voluntariness of separate pro-
gramming has also proven difficult to enforce. Although explicit school poli-
cies requiring pregnant girls to attend separate programs are clearly
impermissible, counseling girls that they would be better off in separate pro-
grams is more difficult to address. For example, in the Title IX challenge to
the CFA separate school in Detroit, plaintiffs alleged that Detroit public
school officials forced them to leave their regular schools when they became
pregnant, telling them they “could not guarantee their public safety in their
pregnant condition” in their regular schools.131 It is impossible to quantify
how often such “counseling” occurs, but commentators opine that Title IX
has not done enough to stop such practices.132 Even without overtly pushing
students toward a separate school, voluntariness is undermined when a sepa-
rate school is the only program with on-site child care and other services
needed to support pregnant and parenting students.133 And yet, providing
unique services to pregnant and parenting students at a separate school ap-
pears to be anticipated by, and not in violation of, the regulation’s allowance
of separate programs.
Apart from the right to a medically necessary leave and full reinstate-
ment, the remaining Title IX rights for pregnant students are firmly en-
sconced in an equal treatment model of equality. Pregnant students must be
treated no worse than similarly situated non-pregnant students, and the regu-
lation identifies the relevant comparison group as nonpregnant students with
129 See Kate Wells, Detroit High School for Pregnant Teens is Closing—This Time,
For Real, MICH. RADIO (June 5, 2014), https://www.michiganradio.org/post/detroit-high-
school-pregnant-teens-closing-time-real [https://perma.cc/ZGG9-QU5E].
130 See Lori Higgins, More Michigan Schools Are Failing: Most Are Charters, DE-
TROIT FREE PRESS (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.freep.com/story/news/education/2018/
03/30/charter-schools-michigan-failing/472900002/ [https://perma.cc/3WEY-2XE7].
131 Id. at *1; see also Kicklighter v. Evans Cty. Sch. Dist., 968 F. Supp. 712 (S.D. Ga.
1997) (plaintiff lost equal protection claim brought under § 1983 despite allegations that
school administrators suggested plaintiff attend an alternative school for disruptive stu-
dents because of her pregnancy status).
132 See Kendra Fershee, An Act for All Contexts: Incorporating the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act into Title IX to Help Pregnant Students Gain and Retain Access to Edu-
cation, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 281, 313 (2010) (discussing an unreported decision in a
2005 case in which students alleged they were involuntarily sent to an inferior separate
school for pregnant students once school officials learned of their pregnancies).
133 Id. at 315 (alleging that they had no other educational options because CFA was
the only school that provided the services they needed and a non-stigmatizing environ-
ment for pregnant and parenting students).
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temporary disabilities.134 Pregnancy, then, is treated as a temporary interrup-
tion of education without long-term consequence. This framework reflects a
similar resistance to “special rights” as was evident in the Supreme Court’s
most recent Pregnancy Discrimination Act case, Young v. United Parcel Ser-
vice, Inc.135 Although the Court in Young crafted a standard that allows preg-
nant employees to challenge many refusals to accommodate pregnancy
under Title VII, the Court repeatedly characterized the plaintiff’s argument
as seeking “most favored nation” status—demanding to be compared to the
employees receiving the most generous accommodations from the em-
ployer.136 The phrase reflects the Court’s resistance to a model of equality
that would grant pregnant workers “special rights.” The Court’s ruling sug-
gests that accommodations for pregnancy may go only so far before moving
from equal to special treatment.
Wanda Pillow has critiqued Title IX’s approach to pregnancy, observing
that the equal treatment standard invites implicit judgments about the de-
servingness of pregnant students. She asks, “[i]s ‘equal treatment’ enacted
through discourses and beliefs that pregnant/parenting students deserve to be
treated equally or because these students do not deserve any extra considera-
tion?”137 Pillow argues that equal treatment is not “neutral” at all but actu-
ally harmful to pregnant students if the treatment deemed “equal” does not
go far enough to provide pregnant students with the support and resources
they need to succeed educationally. Comparing pregnancy to a urinary tract
infection, for example, and allotting bathroom breaks accordingly, or to
physical conditions requiring modifications to desks, reduces pregnancy to a
temporary physical inconvenience incommensurate with its impact on edu-
cation. The equal treatment lens lends credence to a stingy view of what
pregnant students are and are not entitled to receive. Title IX’s limited ac-
commodation of pregnancy—requiring a medically necessary leave—does lit-
tle better, as it too requires only a temporary workaround for the period in
which pregnancy keeps a student homebound. Both sets of rights under Title
IX address only pregnancy’s physical effects on education, rather than the
long-term educational impacts of motherhood.
5. Surveying the Title IX Case Law on Pregnancy
To be sure, there have been some “wins” for pregnant students under
Title IX. In one such case, Hogan v. Ogden, the plaintiff was a student at
Central Washington University and in her eighth month of pregnancy when
her physician placed her on bed rest.138 Instead of allowing her to complete
the work required for a group project assignment, the professor allegedly
134 34 C.F.R. § 106.40(b)(4) (2020).
135 575 U.S. 206, 223–24 (2015).
136 Id. at 235.
137 Pillow, Embodying Policy Studies, supra note 60, at 143. R
138 No. CV-06-5078-EFS, 2008 WL 2954245, at *1 (E.D. Wash. July 30, 2008).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\43-2\HLG205.txt unknown Seq: 28 23-JUN-20 16:07
198 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 43
attempted to persuade her to drop the class even though the other students in
her group offered to work at the plaintiff’s house and wanted her to remain in
the group.139 The plaintiff alleged that other students who had similar con-
flicts had been accommodated and were allowed to complete their cour-
sework, while she was not.140 The court denied the university’s motion for
summary judgment, and the case later settled.141 Similarly, in Frankola v.
Louisiana State University School of Medicine, the plaintiff was able to pre-
vail on a motion to dismiss the complaint based on allegations that she was
denied readmission to medical school due in part to her pregnancy after tak-
ing a medical leave of absence.142 These and other partial victories show that
Title IX can be a useful tool for challenging pregnancy discrimination in
education.143
However, the case law is mixed,144 and perhaps more importantly, it is
sparse.145 In her 2011 article, Michelle Gough identified only eighteen cases
decided in nearly four decades, from 1972 to January of 2010, implicating
Title IX issues related to pregnant and parenting students.146 Several of these
cases did not include Title IX claims even though they involved allegations
of discrimination in education programs relating to a student’s pregnancy or
139 Id. at *2.
140 Id. at *10.
141 Emily McNee, Pregnancy Discrimination in Higher Education: Accommodating
Student Pregnancy, 20 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 63, 72 (2013).
142 No. 15-59332017, 2017 WL 372520, at *1,*5 (E.D. La. Jan. 26, 2017).
143 See, e.g., Conley v. Nw. Fla. St. C., 145 F Supp.3d 1073, 1074 (N.D. Fla. 2015)
(rejecting college’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim that she was denied participation in
clinical rotation program due to her pregnancy in violation of Title IX and holding that
Title IX provides a private right of action to sue for pregnancy discrimination); Varlesi v.
Wayne St. U., 909 F. Supp. 2d 827, 852–53 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (holding plaintiff’s claim
that she was given a failing performance review in her internship because of her preg-
nancy outside of marriage in violation of Title IX survived defendant’s motion for sum-
mary judgment).
144 See, e.g., Workman v. Univ. of Akron, No. 5:16-cv-156, 2017 WL 6326898, at *8
(N.D. Ohio 2017) (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment because plaintiff
failed to plead sufficient facts to support her claim that she was unable to complete prac-
ticum necessary for her masters in family counseling and failed several exams due to
pregnancy discrimination); McConaughy v. U. of Cincinnati, No. 1:08–cv–320–HJW,
2011 WL 1459292, at *1 (S.D. Ohio April 15, 2011) (granting defendant’s motion for
summary judgment where plaintiff, student in Design Architecture Art and Planning,
sued for failure to accommodate her pregnancy, but failed to make out prima facie case
because she failed to allege that she was performing at a level up to her professor’s
legitimate expectations).
145 OCR can enforce Title IX on a separate track apart from private lawsuits, but it is
a weak enforcement mechanism; termination of federal funds is not a realistic threat and,
even if found in violation, recipients can agree to come into compliance before any pen-
alty is meted out. Fershee, supra note 132, at 319–20. R
146 See Michelle Gough, Parenting and Pregnant Students: An Evaluation of the Im-
plementation of the “Other” Title IX, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 211, 219 (2011); see also
Fershee, supra note 132, at 310 (“Since the passage of Title IX, there have been fewer R
than fifteen reported cases where a federal court has heard a claim of pregnancy discrimi-
nation under Title IX, and fewer than five where a student brought an action for preg-
nancy discrimination against her school.”).
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parenting status.147 Our research updating Gough’s list found only seven
cases since 2010 involving alleged sex discrimination on the basis of preg-
nancy or parenting in education programs, one of which did not include a
Title IX claim.148 This paucity of case law, combined with evidence of wide-
spread noncompliance, suggests a larger disconnect between Title IX’s
promise of rights and the reality facing pregnant students. Title IX’s pro-
nouncement of rights may trigger resistance by teachers and administrators
leery of “special treatment” for students viewed as having compromised
their educational potential by becoming pregnant. The low number of cases
may also be indicative of a disconnect between what the law forbids and the
obstacles pregnant and parenting students encounter.
Perhaps most tellingly, all of the recent cases in which plaintiffs have
succeeded in being reinstated or receiving the sought-after accommodations
are at the higher education level. In Gough’s review of the pre-2011 case
law, she found the vast majority of the successful Title IX plaintiffs were
higher education students.149 In our update to that research, all of the cases
except the challenge to the Detroit charter school for pregnant and parenting
students, discussed above, were challenges to alleged pregnancy discrimina-
tion in higher education. What explains the absence of cases at the middle
and high school level?150 The commentary suggests that students at this level
encounter numerous obstacles and discrimination that would violate Title
IX, including refusals to excuse pregnancy-related absences, denial of op-
portunities to make up missed work, and hostility or tracking from teachers
and administrators discouraging these students from continuing in academi-
cally rigorous programs.151 Younger students may be less likely to know
their rights and less able to mobilize to assert them. In addition, Pillow’s
analysis suggests that younger students may be particularly vulnerable to the
stigmatizing discourses that depict pregnant teens and teen mothers as edu-
cationally expendable.152 Teachers, administrators, and even the students
147 See Gough, supra note 146, at 220. R
148 See Holloway v. Howard Univ., 206 F. Supp. 3d 446 (D.D.C. 2016); Conley v.
Nw. Fla. St. Coll., 145 F. Supp. 3d 1073 (N.D. Fla. 2015); Frankola v. La. St. Univ. Sch.
of Med., NO: 15-5933, 2017 WL 372520 (E.D. La. Jan. 26, 2017); D.W. ex rel Crosby v.
Blanche Kelso Bruce Acad., No. 13-12415, 2013 WL 5819619 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29,
2013); Varlesi v. Wayne State Univ., 909 F. Supp. 2d 827 (E.D. Mich. 2012); Workman
v. Univ. of Akron, No. 5:16-cv-156, 2017 WL 6326898 (N.D. Ohio 2017); McConaughy
v. U. of Cincinnati, no 1:08–cv–320–HJW, 2011 WL 1459292 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 15, 2011)
149 See Gough, supra note 146, at 220–247. R
150 Fershee, supra note 132, at 311 (“This dearth of case law could imply that preg- R
nancy discrimination is not happening in federally funded schools, or, as is more likely, it
could mean that when it happens, bringing a case is simply not a possible or desirable
remedy.”).
151 See, e.g., Victoria Ryan, Eliminating the Element of Chance: School District Title
IX Implementation to Support Pregnant and Parenting Students, 32 BERKELEY J. GENDER
L. & JUST. 73, 78–79 (2017); Brittany Ducker, Overcoming the Hurdles: Title IX and
Equal Educational Attainment for Pregnant and Parenting Students, 36 J.L. & EDUC.
445, 448–50 (2007).
152 Pillow, Embodying Policy Studies, supra note 60, at 138. R
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themselves may view pregnancy as an unfortunate but fatalistic ending point
of a successful educational trajectory. Without advocates and resources to
challenge that view, violations of rights are likely to go uncontested and
even unnoticed.153
6. Few Protections Against Discrimination Against Mothers
Whatever rights Title IX secures to help pregnant students navigate
their educational pathways, for all practical purposes, come to a screeching
halt once the pregnancy and recovery from it are over. New mothers gain
little from Title IX’s set of rights for pregnant and parenting students. The
accommodation right in Title IX ends upon reinstatement to the program
after the conclusion of a medically necessary leave.154 And the equal treat-
ment set of rights, which compare pregnancy to a temporary disability, is of
no use once the physical limitations of pregnancy have resolved. At that
point, the regulation guarantees only formal equality. The only Title IX regu-
lation on the rights of parents states that “[a] recipient shall not apply any
rule concerning a student’s actual or potential parental, family, or marital
status which treats students differently on the basis of sex.”155 Mothers may
not be treated worse than fathers, but no educational accommodations or
supports need be provided to either. In the Office for Civil Rights pamphlet
on the rights of pregnant and parenting students, all of the examples of Title
IX violations in the Question and Answer section of the pamphlet involved
schools’ treatment of pregnant students and no Title IX violations specific to
the rights parenting students.156 This absence speaks to the weaker frame-
work of rights for parenting as opposed to pregnancy.
Gender neutrality toward new parents falls far short of what is needed
to cushion new mothers from disruptions in their education.157 Younger wo-
men likely feel the conflicts between parenting and education most acutely
due to the typical lack of flexibility in the school day and the bureaucratic
rigidity of educators at this level.158 Students parenting babies and young
children can quickly fall behind academically or be forced to leave school
altogether for missing school to bond with a newborn, care for a sick child,
153 Fershee, supra note 132, at 319 (criticizing the Title IX regulatory framework for R
lack of reporting requirements with respect to pregnant students and weak enforcement
mechanism, and elaborating the challenges facing pregnant students in asserting their
rights under Title IX).
154 34 C.F.R. § 106.40(b)(5) (2020).
155 34 C.F.R. § 106.40(a) (2020).
156 U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., OFF. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, SUPPORTING THE ACADEMIC SUC-
CESS OF PREGNANT AND PARENTING STUDENTS (June 2013).
157 See Jocelyn Tillisch, Title IX and Gender Stereotype Theory: Protecting Students
from Parental Status Discrimination, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1223 (2019).
158 See Brittany L. Grome, The Four-Week Challenge: Student Mothers, Maternity
Leaves, and Pregnancy-Based Sex Discrimination, 4 ALB. GOVT. L. REV. 538 (2011)
(discussing the challenges faced by new mothers returning to school).
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or take the baby to the doctor.159 The refusal of schools to excuse absences
for missed classes to care for a sick child affects student-mothers much more
than student-fathers.160 Combined with other rigid practices, such as not al-
lowing make-up work, the refusal to accommodate new parents’ caretaking
obligations can mean academic failure for student parents, especially
mothers.161 Pillow identifies deep structural conflicts between schools and
the legal and social service framework governing parents, especially eco-
nomically vulnerable parents and students of color.162 The social welfare sys-
tem and publicly funded child care options, Pillow argues, place demands on
teen mothers that are often incompatible with school rules.163 Educational
policy prioritizing standardized test performance pressures schools to en-
force strict attendance policies and eschew flexibility toward students with
parenting conflicts.164 Title IX does not require schools to adjust their rules
in the face of these conflicting demands.
An early Title IX precedent offered some hope that the law might serve
as a vehicle for challenging formally gender-neutral practices that effectively
deny mothers the support they need to succeed educationally. In De La Cruz
v. Tormey, the Ninth Circuit reinstated a claim challenging the refusal of a
community college to provide child care to students, reversing the lower
court’s grant of summary judgment to the college.165 The court noted several
distinctive facts in the record that made the case more than a run-of-the-mill
lack of sufficient child care, including the college’s awareness of a severe
shortage of affordable child care options in the surrounding area and its fail-
ure to take advantage of grant opportunities that would have provided finan-
cial support for the college to provide needed care, contrary to the
recommendations of its own hired consultant and a faculty-student
committee.166
De La Cruz has never been overruled but likely does not survive subse-
quent developments in the Supreme Court. Much has happened in the quar-
ter century since De La Cruz was decided—most prominently, the Supreme
Court’s holding that disparate impact is not actionable under the statute upon
159 Pillow, Embodying Policy Studies, supra note 60, at 143; Elizabeth M. Hady, The R
Absence of Parenting Students’ Rights: How and Why Title IX Tolerates Discriminatory
Attendance Policies, 21 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 95, 101 (2014).
160 Hady, supra note 159, at 109. R
161 The disproportionate caretaking burdens borne by mothers versus fathers are well
established. See, e.g., DARCY LOCKMAN, ALL THE RAGE, MOTHERS, FATHERS, AND THE
MYTH OF EQUAL PARTNERSHIP 205–241 (2019); Claire Cain Miller, Millennial Men
Aren’t the Dads They Thought They’d Be, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2015), https://www.ny-
times.com/2015/07/31/upshot/millennial-men-find-work-and-family-hard-to-balance
.html [https://perma.cc/8P4U-95GS]; see also Lisa Bunting & Colette McAuley, Re-
search Review: Teenage Pregnancy and Parenthood: The Role of Fathers, 9 CHILD &
FAM. SOC. WORK 295 (2004).
162 Pillow, Embodying Policy Studies, supra note 60, at 143-44. R
163 Id.
164 Hady, supra note 159, at 101. R
165 582 F.2d 45, 64 (9th Cir. 1978).
166 Id. at 48–49.
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which Title IX was modeled, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In
Alexander v. Sandoval, the Court held that Title VI’s ban on race discrimina-
tion in federally funded programs does not encompass disparate impact, so
while the regulations prohibiting disparate impact may be administratively
enforced, they do not support a private right of action for disparate impact
claims.167 What this means for Title IX is not settled, but there is good reason
to believe that post-Sandoval, courts will not sustain disparate impact chal-
lenges under Title IX, whether for the lack of affordable child care options
for student parents or the disparate effects on mothers of other formally gen-
der-neutral educational practices.168
In sum, Title IX’s sex equality framework extends important, but ulti-
mately limited, protection from discrimination against students who are
pregnant and, to an even lesser extent, newly parenting students. Title IX
offers no support, however, for avoiding pregnancy and motherhood in the
first place. For that, the law eschews sex equality altogether in favor of
grounding a limited and ultimately inadequate set of rights in liberty and
autonomy. The next section explores the logic and limits of the law’s ap-
proach to reproductive rights, especially in relation to minors, a group espe-
cially likely to face educational impacts from an unwanted pregnancy.
III. REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AS AUTONOMY RIGHTS: THE AUTONOMY/
EQUALITY SPLIT AND THE LIMITS OF AN AUTONOMY
FRAMEWORK FOR FEMALE STUDENTS
Feminist scholars have long argued that the key difference between
men and women is their differing roles in the reproductive process. Women’s
unique role, which is more extensive and burdensome in every respect, has
been a significant determinant of their inequality in other areas of life such
as education and work.169 Several Supreme Court Justices have made this
connection at various times as well, observing, for example, in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey that the “ability of women to participate equally in the
economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to
control their reproductive lives.”170 Indeed, as Justice Ginsburg noted in a
later pregnancy discrimination case, “[c]ertain attitudes about pregnancy
and childbirth, throughout human history, have sustained pervasive, often
law-sanctioned, restrictions on a woman’s place among paid workers and
167 532 U.S. 275, 282–85 (2001).
168 Hady, supra note 159, at 104–06 (taking a dim view of Title IX’s applicability to R
disparate impact claims); cf. Mason & Younger, supra note 119, at 297 (acknowledging R
contrary arguments but arguing that Sandoval need not govern Title IX and describing
Cannon as a disparate impact challenge).
169 See, e.g., Kay, supra 122; Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 R
U. PENN. L. REV. 955 (1984).
170 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\43-2\HLG205.txt unknown Seq: 33 23-JUN-20 16:07
2020] Reproducing Inequality Under Title IX 203
active citizens.”171 Yet the Court as a whole has often been blind to the sex
equality aspects of women’s reproductive rights and has bifurcated sex
equality law from reproductive rights, which are protected as a matter of
liberty but not women’s equality. Despite some early missteps by the Court,
the treatment of a pregnant student or a pregnant worker is now understood
to implicate sex equality. However, the treatment of that same woman’s fer-
tility, use of contraception, or access to abortion has been understood to
implicate her “liberty” and therefore her right of “privacy.” But, as Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued during her career as a lawyer and advocate for
women’s rights, this distinction is misguided. “Not only the sex discrimina-
tion cases,” she wrote, “but the cases on contraception, abortion, and illegit-
imacy as well, present various faces of a single issue: the roles women are to
play in society. Are women to have the opportunity to participate in full
partnership with men in the nation’s social, political, and economic life?”172
As this section will explore, the Supreme Court’s decision to situate
reproductive rights within a liberty framework under the constitutional right
to privacy rather than an equality one has had many consequences, chief
among them that neither the state nor its institutions (such as schools) are
typically under any obligation to create conditions where a woman’s auton-
omy can be fully exercised. This section will explore the doctrinal grounding
of rights related to the entire reproductive process—not just to a woman’s
plight while pregnant or giving birth—and the consequences for young wo-
men, especially those already marginalized by race, class, or other potential
sources of disadvantage.
A. Grounding of Rights Related to Reproduction
An average woman will be of “reproductive age” for at least three de-
cades.173 Eighty-six percent of women in the United States will give birth to
at least one child, and the average woman will have two or three children.174
Whether a woman has zero, one, or two or more children, she will spend the
171 AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701, 724 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
172 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution: The State of the Art, 4
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 143, 143 (1978).
173 ADAM SONFIELD ET AL., GUTTMACHER INST., MOVING FORWARD: FAMILY PLAN-
NING IN THE ERA OF HEALTH REFORM (2014), https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/
files/report_pdf/family-planning-and-health-reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/QGP4-9N3K]
(“In the United States, the average desired family size is two children. To achieve this
family size, a woman must use contraceptives for roughly three decades.”).
174 Claire Cain Miller, Fertility Rate Is Down, Yet More U.S. Women Are Becoming
Mothers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/upshot/the-
us-fertility-rate-is-down-yet-more-women-are-mothers.html [https://perma.cc/3GPT-
FDSY] (“86 percent of women ages 40 to 44—near the end of their reproductive years—
are mothers . . . .”); GRETCHEN LIVINGSTON, PEW RES. CTR., FAMILY SIZE AMONG
MOTHERS (2015), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/05/07/family-size-among-
mothers/ [https://perma.cc/72WJ-6Z72] (“Now, moms have 2.4 children on average—a
number that has been fairly stable for two decades.”).
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vast majority of her fertile decades trying to prevent pregnancy and likely
some time responding to unwanted pregnancies. What rights does she have
for the aspects of the reproductive process that do not include a viable, con-
tinued pregnancy?
Women’s rights to prevent pregnancy through contraception or to termi-
nate pregnancy via abortion have been understood to raise constitutional,
and often only constitutional, questions. That approach has clear benefits—
rights deemed to be constitutional in nature are more uniform across the
country and cannot, at least in theory, be undermined by legislative policies
that are hostile to those rights—but drawbacks as well. A constitutional right
to buy or use contraception can mean very little to a woman who cannot
afford it, and the constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy can mean very
little to a woman who lives in a state that has driven all the providers out.
The inability to prevent pregnancy or to terminate an unwanted pregnancy
will have hugely disproportionate consequences for the women than for the
men who were involved in conception. The consequence of situating these
rights in a privacy framework means that courts are rarely asked to consider
the implications for gender equality of fettered access to reproductive health
information and services.
1. Contraception: Rights and Access
Legal regulation of contraception in the United States dates primarily to
the Comstock Act, passed by Congress in 1873.175 This law, followed in
form by many state laws, was predicated on the idea “that it was obscene to
separate sex and procreation.”176 Although the Comstock Act was repealed
in 1909, some of the state analogs persisted well into the twentieth century.
These laws were ostensibly gender-neutral, but they were enacted against a
backdrop of deeply entrenched views about the proper roles of men and
women and equally entrenched double standards when it came to sex. As
Neil and Reva Siegel argue, the gender differences were not limited to social
norms or disparate impact—courts interpreted the laws in sex-differentiated
ways, permitting, for example, exceptions for men who wanted to use con-
doms to prevent sexually transmitted diseases but not for women who
wanted to prevent even a dangerous pregnancy.177 What put an end to these
laws was not a recognition of the role these laws played, both as written and
as interpreted, in exacerbating women’s inequality. Rather, the Supreme
Court intervened to protect the right of privacy.
175 Comstock Act ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598, 598 (1873) (prohibiting the sale or distribu-
tion in the U.S. mail of articles used “for the prevention of conception, or for causing
unlawful abortion” and prohibiting dissemination of information about contraception or
abortion because it was deemed “obscene”).
176 Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Contraception as a Sex Equality Right, 124 YALE
L.J. F. 349, 351 (2015).
177 Id. at 351–52.
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Connecticut law made it a crime for any person to use “any drug, me-
dicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception” or for
any person to assist or abet another person’s use of contraception.178 To stage
a challenge to the law, a doctor and an executive at Planned Parenthood
opened a clinic in New Haven, through which they gave “information, in-
struction, and medical advice to ‘married persons’ as to the means of
preventing conception.”179 They then “examined the wife and prescribed the
best contraceptive device or material for her use.”180 The doctor and clinic
director were arrested and convicted under these statutes, the constitutional-
ity of which they challenged.181 This challenge ultimately reached the U.S.
Supreme Court, in Griswold v. Connecticut, which was asked whether the
state of Connecticut could constitutionally criminalize the distribution and
use of contraception by married couples.182 In a brief majority opinion, Jus-
tice William O. Douglas described the many different provisions of the Con-
stitution that expressly or by interpretation recognized rights of privacy—the
right against unreasonable search and seizure, the right to freely associate,
the right to raise children without interference from the government, for ex-
ample.183 He then wrote that Connecticut’s contraceptive ban “concerns a
relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees.”184 By criminalizing not only the sale of contra-
ceptives but also their use, Connecticut sought to achieve its goal of restrict-
ing sex to reproductive purposes with “a maximum destructive impact upon
that relationship.”185 In a now-famous quote, he asked whether Connecticut
would have the police “search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for
telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?”186 Surely, he concluded, the
“very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage
relationship,” and barring the police from such a “sacred precinct” was one
function of “a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights.”187
In 1972, the Court extended the constitutional right to use contracep-
tives to single people in Eisenstadt v. Baird.188 In the majority opinion, Jus-
tice William J. Brennan wrote that the right of privacy was a right of
individuals, married or not. The decision whether to have a baby was to
178 CONN. REV. STAT. § 6246 (1939); see also State v. Nelson, 11 A.2d 856, 862
(Conn. 1940) (refusing to uphold “medicinal” ban on contraceptives). For a detailed ac-
count of the challenges to the Connecticut law before one reached the U.S. Supreme
Court, see Siegel & Siegel, supra note 176, at 350–56. R




183 Id. at 483–85.
184 Id. at 485.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 485–86.
188 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
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remain free of “unwarranted governmental intrusion.”189 That everyone has
the right to use birth control is a widely accepted principle. Judge Robert
Bork’s open opposition to the Griswold ruling cost him a seat on the Su-
preme Court in 1987.190 The legacy of a landmark ruling like Griswold v.
Connecticut goes far beyond increasing the accessibility of contraception.
Griswold was part and parcel of an era that gave women—through legal,
social, and technological developments—greater control over reproduction.
Of women who have ever had sex, ninety-nine percent have used contracep-
tion other than natural family planning (including ninety-eight percent of
Catholic women, despite the Church’s official denunciation in response to
the development of the birth control pill in 1968).191And that control, in turn,
facilitated women’s greater integration into the labor force and access to bet-
ter economic security.
A constitutional right does not, however, guarantee access, and the
fights after Griswold were focused almost exclusively on funding. The birth
control pill was first approved in 1960, and its use became even widespread
after Congress passed Title X in 1970, which resulted in the establishment of
family planning clinics supported by federal money.192 Many poor women
now had access to birth control.193 But middle-class women struggled to af-
ford birth control, in part because it was routinely excluded from otherwise
comprehensive health insurance plans.194 Their fight revolved around “con-
traceptive equity” lawsuits, which raised the question whether employer-
based health plans should cover the cost of prescription birth control that
was used only by women and the deprivation of which harmed women dis-
proportionately. Cases were litigated under Title VII, a broad employment
discrimination law, with mixed results.195 The number of plans that covered
189 Id.
190 See MARK GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF
AMERICA’S REJECTION OF ROBERT BORK’S NOMINATION TO THE SUPREME COURT 211–13
(1992); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 7–12 (1971).
191 RACHEL K. JONES & JOERG DREWEKE, GUTTMACHER INST., COUNTERING CONVEN-
TIONAL WISDOM: NEW EVIDENCE ON RELIGION AND CONTRACEPTIVE USE (2011), https://
www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/religion-and-contraceptive-use.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7QEV-UH68]; see also Lisa McClain, How the Catholic Church Came
to Oppose Birth Control, HUFFINGTON POST (July 16, 2018, 6:03 PM), https://www.huf-
fingtonpost.com/entry/how-the-catholic-church-came-to-oppose-birth-control_us_5b4cd6
03e4b02538dbcaf463 [https://perma.cc/CVU5-JVKH] (analyzing the ever-changing
view of the Catholic church regarding use of contraceptives).
192 See Public Health Service Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-572, § 6, 84 Stat. 1504,
1506 (1970).
193 RACHEL BENSON GOLD, GUTTMACHER INST., TITLE X: THREE DECADES OF AC-
COMPLISHMENT (Feb. 2001), https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/article_files/
gr040105.pdf.
194 Robyn E. Zolman, Insurance Coverage of Prescription Contraceptives (unpub-
lished paper), https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/8889475/Zolman.html?se
quence=2&isAllowed=y.
195 Compare Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1271 (W.D. Wash.
2001) (omitting coverage for contraception from a comprehensive health insurance plan
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prescription contraceptives increased dramatically as a result of state man-
dated-benefit laws.196 The growth in coverage was the product largely of
state mandated-benefit laws, passed in twenty-eight states beginning with
Maryland in 1998, which required insurers to include contraceptive coverage
in their plans.197 But insurance coverage is only a threshold issue; prescrip-
tion birth control can still be out of reach because of co-payments and
deductibles.
The Affordable Care Act was signed into law in 2010.198 Subsequent
regulations required employer-based health plans to cover prescription con-
traceptives at no cost to the patient.199 The so-called contraceptive mandate
was based on information from a comprehensive study of health care needs
and access in the United States, which was conducted by the nonpartisan,
congressionally chartered group, the Institute of Medicine (IOM).200 Focus-
ing on health outcomes and access, IOM concluded that contraception is an
“essential health benefit” and that the largest barrier to access is cost.201
IOM’s recommendations were adopted in the Women’s Preventative Services
Guidelines, which require coverage, without charging patients “a co-pay-
ment, co-insurance, or deductible” for all FDA-approved contraceptive
methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling.202
This mandate is aligned with the consensus of the medical profession—that
constitutes sex discrimination), with Cummins v. Illinois, 2005 WL 8143169 at *1 (S.D.
Ill. 2010) (excluding coverage does not violate Title VII, as amended by the PDA), and
Standridge v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 479 F.3d 936, 938 (8th Cir. 2007) (excluding
coverage does not violate Title VII).
196 See GUTTMACHER INST., Contraceptive Use in the United States (Oct. 2015), http:/
/www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_contr_use.html [https://perma.cc/873D-TYAM]; see also
GUTTMACHER INST., Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives (Aug. 2018), https://www
.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/insurance-coverage-contraceptives [https://perma
.cc/Z4AT-K5LF].




CDS2]. Health plans participating in the Federal Employees Health Benefit Program
were required to cover prescription contraceptives beginning in 1998. See Pub. L. No.
108-7, 117 Stat. 474 (2003).
198 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act , Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010); Obama Signs Historic Health Care Legislation, NPR (Mar. 23, 2010), https://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125058400 [https://perma.cc/2RTR-
RH8R].
199 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2018).
200 77 Fed. Reg. 8725–26 (Feb. 15, 2012).
201 Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Health & Hum. Servs., Affordable Care Act Ensures
Women Receive Preventive Services at No Additional Cost (Aug. 1, 2011), https://
wayback.archive-it.org/3926/20140108162111/http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/
08/20110801b.html [https://perma.cc/4N4T-JMG7]; see also Institute of Medicine,
Clinical Preventive Services for Women: Closing the Gaps 2 (2011).
202 Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, U.S. HEALTH RES. & SERV. ADMIN.
(2019), https://www.hrsa.gov/womens-guidelines/index.html [https://perma.cc/KJH7-
SELS].
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women’s health depends on access to contraception.203 Although the mandate
increased access greatly,204 it has been the subject of many legal challenges
and has been curtailed through the Supreme Court’s recognition of a relig-
ious exemption. The original regulations mandating contraceptive coverage
contained a limited religious exemption.205 The limits were challenged by
owners of a closely held corporation, and the Supreme Court sided with the
owners, broadening the exemption in the process. In Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc.,206 the Court reached the dubious conclusion that corpora-
tions that are not religious in nature can have religious beliefs and, on the
basis of those beliefs, demand an exemption.207 The Trump administration
went even further, permitting any insurer to omit contraceptive coverage for
religious or moral reasons.208 These actions are ostensibly premised on the
goal of deterring risky sexual behavior among teens and adults, but there is
no scientific evidence to suggest that depriving people of access to contra-
ception will have this effect.209
The Trump administration’s rollback of the contraceptive mandate is
part and parcel of a general attack on contraceptive access. The constitu-
tional “right” is intact, but access is more threatened than at any point in the
last several decades. Ideological battles have made contraceptive access con-
troversial, and individuals, legislators, and corporations have gained greater
ability to interfere with the reproductive healthcare of others based on their
asserted religious beliefs. While it still may be a minority view, religious and
203 Id.
204 The proportion of women paying for prescription oral contraceptives dropped
from 20 percent to less than 4 percent. In total, more than 55 million women can obtain
birth control at no cost. In 2013 alone, women saved $1.4 billion in costs for oral contra-
ceptives. See Gaylynn Burroughs, Not Going Back: The Affordable Care Act and Medi-
caid, MS. MAG., (Dec. 27, 2016), https://msmagazine.com/2016/12/27/not-going-back-
health-care-abortion-birth-control/ [https://perma.cc/UGP4-NJAW]; see also Ashley H.
Snyder et al., The Impact of the Affordable Care Act on Contraceptive Use and Costs
among Privately Insured Women, 28 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 219, 221 (2018).
205 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FACT SHEET: FINAL RULES ON RELIG-
IOUS AND MORAL EXEMPTIONS AND ACCOMMODATION FOR COVERAGE OF CERTAIN PRE-




206 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
207 Id. at 692–93. The Supreme Court recently agreed to review another case on the
religious exemption to the contraceptive mandate. See Little Sisters of the Poor v. Penn-
sylvania, No. 19-431, 2020 WL 254158 at *1 (Jan. 17, 2020).
208 See Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preven-
tive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57536, 57537 (Nov. 15, 2018)
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147); Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Cover-
age of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57592,
57593 (Nov. 15, 2018) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
209 See Abigail Abrams, No, Birth Control Doesn’t Make You Have Riskier Sex, Re-
searchers Say, TIME (Oct. 12, 2017), http://time.com/4975951/donald-trump-birth-con-
trol-mandate-sexual-behavior [https://perma.cc/W2DB-VC73].
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moral opposition to contraception is a view now freely expressed and part of
the discourse.210
Denial of access to contraception reverberates far beyond the uterine
walls. Women who cannot control the timing and number of pregnancies
face impaired economic security, especially low-income women.211 In addi-
tion to other disadvantages, low-income women are overrepresented among
those who are not using contraception but do not wish to become preg-
nant.212 They are more likely to rely on public funding, including Title X and
Medicaid, and thus have their access impaired from a variety of different
governmental actions.213
Although the right to contraception is often cast in terms of privacy and
battles over access often focus on cost or religious freedom, women’s equal-
ity is very much compromised in a system that does not ensure meaningful
access to birth control. Insufficient attention has been paid to the ways in
which access to contraception is essential to women’s equality. Elizabeth
Sepper points out the consequences of such a blind spot in the Court’s analy-
sis of the religious exemption to the contraceptive mandate:
As feminists have long recognized, without control over their re-
productive health, women can pursue their professional and educa-
tional ambitions only with great difficulty. Empirical studies
confirm that access to contraception contributes to higher educa-
tional attainment and more financially desirable jobs for women,
210 See generally Elizabeth W. Patton et al., How Does Religious Affiliation Affect
Women’s Attitudes Toward Reproductive Health Policy? Implications for the Affordable
Care Act, 91 CONTRACEPTION 513 (2015) (concluding that, although the majority of re-
ligious people support contraception, there exists an identifiable minority that opposes
contraceptive measures).
211 Research also demonstrates that access to abortion plays an important role in wo-
men’s independence and autonomy. See, e.g., Caitlin Knowles Myers, The Power of
Abortion Policy: Reexamining the Effects of Young Women’s Access to Reproductive Con-
trol, 125 J. POL. ECON. 2178, 2222 (2017).
212 See KAISER FAM. FOUND., WOMEN’S SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SER-
VICES: KEY FINDINGS FROM THE 2017 KAISER WOMEN’S HEALTH SURVEY (2018), https://
www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/issue-brief/womens-sexual-and-reproductive-health-
services-key-findings-from-the-2017-kaiser-womens-health-survey [https://perma.cc/
AAE5-BBHZ] (concluding, also, that Trump Administration policies would “dispropor-
tionately limit access [to reproductive health care] to low-income and minority
women”).
213 USHA RANJI ET AL., KAISER FAM. FOUND., FINANCING FAMILY PLANNING SER-
VICES FOR LOW-INCOME WOMEN: THE ROLE OF PUBLIC PROGRAMS (2019), https://www
.kff.org/womens-health-policy/issue-brief/financing-family-planning-services-for-low-in-
come-women-the-role-of-public-programs [https://perma.cc/K7BL-XJ3Q]; see also
LAURIE SOBEL ET AL., KAISER FAM. FOUND., PROPOSED CHANGES TO TITLE X: IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR WOMEN AND FAMILY PLANNING PROVIDERS (2018), https://www.kff.org/
womens-health-policy/issue-brief/proposed-changes-to-title-x-implications-for-women-
and-family-planning-providers [https://perma.cc/A5YA-3HRH]; Kari White et al., The
Impact of Reproductive Health Legislation on Family Planning Clinic Services in Texas,
105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 851, 851 (May 2015); C. Junda Woo et al., Women’s Exper-
iences After Planned Parenthood’s Exclusion from a Family Planning Program in Texas,
93 CONTRACEPTION 298, 298 (2016).
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in turn reducing the gender pay gap. . . . The fact that only women
bear children and (due to the limits of today’s technology) use pre-
scription contraceptives is biological, but the imposition of finan-
cial burdens on reproductive control is social. By allowing
employers to exclude contraceptives from insurance plans, society,
not biology, has subjected women to inequality.214
Even more broadly, the lack of access to contraception contributes to
women’s inequality. The ability to control the number and timing of
pregnancies is a key determinant of women’s ability to achieve equality in
many dimensions, including family, education, and work.215 The connection
between greater access to contraception and fewer unintended pregnancies,
fewer abortions, and fewer maternal deaths, is both direct and proven.216 And
the benefits go beyond the obvious ones. Control over reproduction is cen-
tral to a woman’s ability to obtain an education, pursue a career, and achieve
economic self-sufficiency.217 The argument that women must have the ability
to control reproduction, as Justice Ginsburg argued in her dissent in Hobby
Lobby, in order “to participate equally in the economic and social life of the
Nation” is undeniable.218
2. Abortion: Rights and Access
The right to privacy is also the grounding for abortion rights. In 1973,
the Supreme Court drew on the notion of privacy that it relied on in Gris-
wold to decide that a woman has the right to terminate a pre-viability preg-
nancy.219 Abortion, at the time, was criminalized in most U.S. states under
laws adopted during the middle of the nineteenth century.220 At common
214 Elizabeth Sepper, Gendering Corporate Conscience, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER
193, 208–09 (2015).
215 See, e.g., ADAM SONFIELD ET AL., GUTTMACHER INST., THE SOCIAL AND ECO-
NOMIC BENEFITS OF WOMEN’S ABILITY TO DETERMINE WHETHER AND WHEN TO HAVE
CHILDREN 7–14 (2019), https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/social-
economic-benefits.pdf [https://perma.cc/3S68-AUM8]; Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F.
Katz, The Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and Women’s Career and Marriage De-
cisions, 110 J. POL. ECON. 730 (2002).
216 See, e.g., Frank A. Sonnenberg et al., Costs and Net Health Effects of Contracep-
tive Methods, 69 CONTRACEPTION 447, 456–57 (2004).
217 On the connection between contraceptive access and women’s economic empow-
erment, see e.g., Joanna L. Grossman, Griswold v. Connecticut: The Start of the Revolu-
tion, JUSTIA’S VERDICT (June 8, 2015), https://verdict.justia.com/2015/06/08/griswold-v-
connecticut-the-start-of-the-revolution [https://perma.cc/N8CQ-2PTN].
218 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 741 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992)).
On the connection between reproductive rights and women’s economic security, see
CYNTHIA HESS ET AL., INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RES., THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE
STATES: 2015, 165–77 (2015), https://iwpr.org/wp-content/uploads/wpallimport/files/
iwpr-export/publications/R400-FINAL%208.25.2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7LH-
QLBD].
219 410 U.S. 113, 152–160 (1973).
220 Id. at 139-41.
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law, both in England and the U.S., abortions before “quickening”—the first
detectable fetal movement around sixteen to eighteen weeks gestation—had
been permitted.221 Roe launched an era of abortion rights along with a pow-
erful countermovement.
Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion in Roe, anchoring the
right of abortion in the right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause and encompassing the right to terminate a pregnancy
before a certain point.222 There is no discussion in the opinion of women’s
equality vis-à-vis men or in society generally or of the ways in which forced
pregnancy might impair the ability of women to participate fully in society.
Rather, the opinion rested on a contest of rights, resolved by the primacy of
a woman’s right to privacy.223 Rejecting the state’s claim, the Court held that
a fetus is not a person for constitutional purposes and is not entitled to con-
stitutional protection in its own right that needs to be balanced against the
woman’s own rights.224 The state, the Court held, acquires an interest in pro-
tecting fetal life when the fetus reaches viability.225 This ruling was a death
knell to abortion laws remaining on the books, which had restrictions that
could not comport with the newly announced standard.
The Supreme Court revisited the abortion issue many times after Roe,
including in an important 1992 case, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, in which
it reformulated the constitutional right to give states a greater opportunity to
express their preference for childbirth over abortion and their regard for fetal
life.226 In the 1980s, states began passing restrictive abortion laws that argua-
bly violated Roe—or at least pushed its boundaries.227 In Casey, the Court
considered the validity of several restrictions, including parental consent,
spousal notification, a twenty-four hour waiting period, and an informed
221 JANET FARRELL BRODIE, CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION IN NINETEENTH-CEN-
TURY AMERICA 253–54 (1994); JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS
AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1800-1900 8 (1978); ROSEMARY NOSSIFF,
BEFORE ROE: ABORTION POLICY IN THE STATES 31–34 (2001). The pre-Roe bans typically
penalized and were enforced against doctors but not pregnant women. On this complex
history of abortion and punishment, see Mary Ziegler, Some Form of Punishment: Penal-
izing Women for Abortion, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 735, 740 (2018) (noting that
although some laws technically permitted pregnant women to be prosecuted for soliciting
or conspiring with the abortion provider, “few women went to prison for having an
abortion”).
222 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65.
223 See id. at 158 (“[T]he word ‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does
not include the unborn.”).
224 Id.
225 Id. at 163–64.
226 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (considering the con-
stitutionality of a wide range of abortion restrictions). There was no majority opinion in
Casey. Justice Kennedy wrote for a three-judge plurality and found additional votes in the
concurrences for the undue burden standard. For a comprehensive history, see MARY
ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE (2015).
227 See Mary Ziegler, Substantial Uncertainty: Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt
and the Future of Abortion Law, 2016 S. Ct. Rev. 77, 93-101; see generally Ziegler,
supra note 221. R
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consent provision requiring physicians to provide information on fetal devel-
opment and adoption.228 Each restriction survived the Court’s analysis except
the spousal notification provision.229 Although the Court reaffirmed the basic
principle of Roe that women have a constitutional right to terminate a preg-
nancy within certain constraints, a majority of the Justices reformulated the
standard to protect a right to abortion before viability without undue burden
from the government.230 The Court also recognized the right of states to ex-
press their interest in protecting fetal life from the outset of pregnancy,
rather than only after viability, a shift that has eased the way for a variety of
onerous burdens purporting to provide women with the opportunity for more
informed consent.231
The Supreme Court reaffirmed constitutional protection for the abortion
decision as recently as 2016, in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.232 In
that case, the Court invalidated two provisions of Texas law that imposed
requirements that made it difficult or impossible for many abortion clinics to
operate.233 Those regulations constituted an undue burden that Texas had
placed in front of women seeking to terminate their pregnancies.
The Court’s abortion jurisprudence—even when it appears to protect
women’s rights—reflects an idealization of motherhood, a pro-maternalism
that elevates women’s role as nurturers and mothers rather than as autono-
mous decisionmakers who might pursue any number of avenues to individ-
ual fulfillment. This view was most obviously on display in Gonzales v.
Carhart, in which the Supreme Court upheld a federal ban on a particular
method of second-trimester abortion in order to protect women from their
own regret (which they were assumed to experience).234 As Justice Kennedy
wrote, “It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to
abort must struggle grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when
she learns, only after the event, what she once did not know: that she al-
lowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of
her unborn child, a child assuming the human form.”235 The woman in this
narrative is already a mother, whether or not she has or ever gives birth; is
bonded to an unborn child; and will suffer from the lost pregnancy.236 This
ruling was made possible by Casey, which permitted state restrictions de-
228 505 U.S. at 833.
229 Id. at 881–87.
230 Id. at 887–98.
231 Id. at 860, 872–73, 876–77, 881.
232 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016).
233 Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2318–20.
234 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“While we find no reliable data to measure the phe-
nomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice
to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.”).
235 Id. at 159–60.
236 On this treatment of women in abortion law, see Joanna L. Grossman & Linda
McClain, Gonzales v. Carhart: How the Supreme Court’s Validation of the Federal Par-
tial-Birth Abortion Ban Act Affects Women’s Constitutional Liberty and Equality, FIN-
DLAW (May 7, 2007), https://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/gonzales-v-car
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\43-2\HLG205.txt unknown Seq: 43 23-JUN-20 16:07
2020] Reproducing Inequality Under Title IX 213
signed to persuade women to choose motherhood as purportedly consistent
with a core autonomy right, as long as it stopped short of coercion. Abortion
rulings routinely refer to the women involved as “mothers,” suggesting that
most women would, or should, choose motherhood, given the proper amount
of support, information, or persuasion. This kind of pro-maternalism lan-
guage is incompatible with the prioritization of girls’ and women’s education
in Title IX. It sets up the girl or woman who abandons her child or who
terminates her pregnancy to pursue her own fulfillment or potential as devi-
ating from the ideal—an unsympathetic subject for rights.
The Supreme Court’s idealization of mothers in its abortion jurispru-
dence is one way that the privacy grounding of the abortion right is in ten-
sion with sex equality law, including Title IX. A more practical consequence
of locating abortion rights in a privacy right rather than in sex equality is that
the right to privacy secures only a right to be let alone, and not a right to the
conditions or resources necessary to carry out one’s choices. As a result,
abortion jurisprudence developed in ways that cemented a strong dividing
line between the right to terminate a pregnancy and the ability to access that
right in practical terms. The former was of constitutional interest, the latter
left for policymakers to fight over and women to suffer their wrath. The key
barriers to access include cost and the lack of access to providers.237 The
restrictions permitted by Casey have made both of these barriers even more
difficult to overcome. State laws that require waiting periods, for example,
sometimes force women to add the cost of a hotel stay and additional days of
missed work to the calculation.238 Mandatory waiting periods and multiple
trips to providers to satisfy informed consent requirements also burden
young women who are still in school and subject to strict attendance poli-
cies. Laws that impose restrictions on providers have caused many of them
to go out of business, and they often remain out of business even if the
restriction is invalidated by a court.239 Although the Court’s ruling in Whole
Women’s Health invalidated some of these restrictions, many providers had
hart-how-the-supreme-courts-validation-of-the-federal-partial-birth-abortion-ban-act-af-
fects-womens-constitutional-liberty-and-equality.html [https://perma.cc/7QYZ-GCTD].
237 See generally Jenna Jerman et al., Barriers to Abortion Care and Their Conse-
quences for Patients Traveling for Services: Qualitative Findings from Two States, 49
PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 95 (2017).
238 See, e.g., Texas Policy Evaluation Project, Impact of abortion restrictions in Texas
(2013), http://www.utexas.edu/cola/txpep/_files/pdf/TxPEP-ResearchBrief-Im-
pactofAbortionRestrictions.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2A8-YTZ5]; Jerman et al., supra note
237; see also Kinsey Hasstedt, The State of Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights R
in the State of Texas: A Cautionary Tale, 17 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 14, 16 (2014).
239 See, e.g., Marie Solis, Indie Abortion Clinics Can’t Be Replaced, but They’re Dy-
ing Out, VICE (Dec. 23, 2019 11:11 a.m.), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/qjdp4x/
independent-abortion-clinics-are-closing-thanks-to-abortion-restrictions [https://perma
.cc/N6T9-9WT2]; Abortion Care Network, 2019 Report: Communities Need Clinics
(2019), https://www.abortioncarenetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Communities-
NeedClinics2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/284H-DHF7].
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already closed and remain closed.240 Moreover, the Supreme Court just
agreed to review a ruling of the Fifth Circuit that upheld the constitutionality
of TRAP laws that are almost identical to the ones struck down in Whole
Women’s Health, a sign that the newly composed Supreme Court is prepared
to roll back abortion rights in ways that, at a minimum, impair access.241
The Supreme Court exacerbated this disconnect between rights and ac-
cess to abortion when it upheld the constitutionality of the Hyde Amend-
ment, a federal law that limits federal reimbursement for abortions to few
circumstances, such as when necessary to save the life of the mother or to
end pregnancies resulting from rape or incest.242 The Supreme Court upheld
the Hyde Amendment on the theory that it does not unconstitutionally bur-
den a woman’s exercise of her fundamental right to an abortion but rather
leaves her in the same place she would be without a federal funding pro-
gram.243 Medicaid is most affected by this rule.244 Although thirty-three
states and the District of Columbia provide their own funds for indigent
women, only eight states voluntarily provide funds for all or most medically
necessary abortions, with nine additional states providing funds only pursu-
ant to court order.245 Moreover, more than half the states restrict abortion
coverage in plans sold on healthcare exchanges created under the Affordable
Care Act, and eleven restrict abortion coverage in all private insurance
plans.246
Poor women have fewer reproductive choices and more abortions due
to the chronic underfunding of family planning programs. This problem will
get worse under the new domestic “gag rule” adopted by the Trump admin-
istration. Nearly half of pregnancies are unintended, and forty-two percent of
these end in abortion.247 Black women are more than twice as likely to have
unintended pregnancies as non-Hispanic white women, and poor women are
240 See Ashley Lopez, For Supporters of Abortion Access, Troubling Trends in Texas,
NPR (Nov. 18, 2019 5:01 a.m.), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/11/18/
741117422/for-supporters-of-abortion-access-troubling-trends-in-texas [https://perma.cc/
R62R-HYAG].
241 See June Medical Services, L.L.C. v. Gee, 140 S. Ct. 35, 35 (2019) (granting
certiorari).
242 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980) (rejecting constitutional challenge to
the Hyde Amendment, which withdrew federal funding even for “medically necessary
abortions”).
243 Id. at 317.
244 Cf. GUTTMACHER INST., State Funding of Abortion Under Medicaid (Aug. 1,
2019), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_SFAM.pdf [https://perma.cc/
UR6P-NPQN] (analyzing state funding of abortion under Medicaid, guided by Hyde
Amendment).
245 Id.
246 GUTTMACHER INST., Regulating Insurance Coverage of Abortion (Aug. 1, 2019),
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/restricting-insurance-coverage-abortion
[https://perma.cc/P2WA-2RXJ] (“26 states restrict abortion coverage in plans offered
through the insurance exchanges”).
247 GUTTMACHER INST., Unintended Pregnancy in the United States (Jan. 2019),
https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/unintended-pregnancy-united-states [https://per
ma.cc/9KPH-U9XX].
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more than five times as likely as women at the highest income level.248 Wo-
men of color are more likely to be on Medicaid.249 Two-thirds of the 1.5
million unplanned births in 2010 were paid for by public insurance pro-
grams, primarily Medicaid, as compared to thirty-eight percent of planned
births.250
All this to say that the Court’s distinction between rights and access
harms marginalized women even more harshly. Reproductive justice advo-
cates Loretta Ross and Rickie Solinger argue persuasively that government
funding for abortion is a key determinant of access: “When a low-income
person makes a decision to have an abortion, her federal health insurance,
Medicaid, will not pay for it. So to pay for the abortion she may have to
make the brutal decision to use money meant to pay for basic necessities,
such as heat and water and rent and food for herself and her children.”251
Moreover, they explain, the “officials who make law and policy do not com-
pute the ways that her poverty and the state’s refusal to provide comprehen-
sive health care rob the woman of dignity and physical safety and are likely
to deepen her poverty and lack of options.”252 There has been renewed activ-
ism against the Hyde Amendment, but it remains controlling law.253 Some
women are paying a steep price for the recent shifts in favor of “religious
liberty” over women’s health.
3. Sexual and Reproductive Health for Minors
Perhaps the biggest problem with leaving reproductive rights outside of
sex discrimination law is that the framework to which they are left is de-
signed for adults. Reproductive rights are grounded in autonomy, and auton-
omy presupposes an adult subject. In fact and in law, minors are constrained
in their agency; they have only limited autonomy. Accordingly, the right to
privacy in reproduction for minors was destined to impose greater restric-
tions on young women who have not yet reached the age of majority. The
248 See id.
249 See ALINA SALGANICOFF ET AL., KAISER FAM. FOUND., THE HYDE AMENDMENT
AND COVERAGE FOR ABORTION SERVICES (2019), https://www.kff.org/womens-health-
policy/issue-brief/the-hyde-amendment-and-coverage-for-abortion-services/ [https://per
ma.cc/VJ29-FVKY].
250 ADAM SONFIELD & KATHRYN KOST, Guttmacher Inst., Public Costs from Unin-
tended Pregnancies and the Role of Public Insurance Programs in Paying for Pregnancy-
Related Care: National and State Estimates for 2010 (2015), https://www.guttmacher.org/
report/public-costs-unintended-pregnancies-and-role-public-insurance-programs-paying-
pregnancy [https://perma.cc/9V99-YHSF].
251 LORETTA J. ROSS & RICKIE SOLINGER, REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION
135–36 (2017).
252 Id.
253 See Maggie Astor, What Is the Hyde Amendment? A Look at Its Impact as Biden
Reverses His Stance, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2019, at A12; Julian Shen-Berro, The Hyde
Amendment: How a 43-Year-Old Provision Became a 2020 Issue, HUFFINGTON POST
(June 6, 2019), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/hyde-amendment-repeal-democratic-pri-
mary-joe-biden_n_5cf92b3be4b0638bdfa5eaae [https://perma.cc/2GGB-44WX].
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law’s bifurcation of minors’ reproductive rights into the realm of privacy
instead of equality has grave consequences for younger women’s educational
equality. Although, of course, not all minors are in school and not all stu-
dents are minors, most persons under the age of eighteen are either in school
or would benefit from additional schooling in their future careers.
Indeed, consistent with the logic of an autonomy-based set of rights,
women under the age of eighteen face additional and unique barriers to ac-
cess of sexual and reproductive health services. Although the educational
consequences of an unintended pregnancy are even more dire for them than
for adult women, these consequences are neglected by a set of legal rights
that pays no attention to educational equality. The barriers minors face take a
variety of forms, both legal and non-legal.
For minors, access to contraception is undermined by cost and logistics,
but also by fewer protections for their “right” to access it in the first in-
stance. In Carey v. Population Serv. Int’l, the Court invalidated a New York
law that, among other things, restricted the sale of contraceptives to minors
younger than sixteen, but sidestepped the underlying question of whether
minors have a constitutional right to access to contraception.254 Minors can-
not traditionally consent to their own medical care; that right belonged to
their legal parent or guardian.255 Some minors are able to obtain parental
consent for birth control, but those who are not live at the mercy of their
state legislature. Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia permit mi-
nors to consent to contraceptive services on their own behalf, and another
twenty-four states permit them to consent in at least some circumstances.256
In the four states with no statute, minors need parental consent as they would
for any other medical procedure or prescription unless they seek services
with a provider federally funded by Title X, which overrides state parental
consent laws in this context.257 The rollback of Title X will affect minors and
adult women, especially in those states in which only Title X clinics can
dispense birth control without parental consent. Minors thus start with less
of a right, compounded by unique challenges that impair access such as the
254 431 U.S. 678, 693–94 (1977).
255 See, e.g., VERNON’S TEX. FAMILY CODE § 32.003 (listing specific instances in
which a minor can consent to her own treatment); see generally HEATHER D. BOONSTRA
& ELIZABETH NASH, GUTTMACHER INST., MINORS AND THE RIGHT TO CONSENT TO MEDI-
CAL CARE (2000), https://www.guttmacher.org/gpr/2000/08/minors-and-right-consent-
health-care [https://perma.cc/3ZYA-LQ6E] (noting evolution of minors’ right to consent
to own medical care over time and across states).
256 See GUTTMACHER INST., Minors’ Access to Contraceptive Services (Mar. 1, 2020),
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/minors-access-contraceptive-services
[https://perma.cc/6CPB-D8J7].
257 The four states with no relevant statute are North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, and
Wisconsin. See id. On Title X’s parameters, see 42 U.S.C. § 300(a) (2018); 42 C.F.R.
§§ 59.5(a)(4), (14) (2020).
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lack of transportation or money and the inability to sneak away for medical
appointments undetected by a disapproving parent.258
Such policies run counter to abundant evidence that minors benefit
from unfettered access to contraception—including promising results of a
program in Colorado that has provided long-acting contraceptives, such as
IUDs, completely free to teenagers and low-income women.259 The teen birth
rate fell forty percent in four years, as did the rate of abortion.260 Nonethe-
less, the federal government continues to implement public health rules
based on ideology rather than on science, eschewing evidence-based
approaches.
For minors, the right to obtain an abortion is even more tenuous than
their right to access contraception. Their abortion rights are determined not
only by Roe and Casey, but also by a series of cases beginning in 1976. In
Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, the Court invalidated a provi-
sion of Missouri law that required all unmarried women under eighteen to
obtain parental consent for an abortion.261 Justice Blackmun acknowledged
that minors’ rights might not be equivalent to those held by adult women, but
concluded that giving an absolute veto to a parent was clearly an infringe-
ment.262 Then, in 1979, the Court spelled out the circumstances under which
parental notification or consent could be required. The Court held in Bellotti
v. Baird263 that the right to seek an abortion belongs to minor as well as adult
women but in a less robust forum. In Hodgson v. Minnesota, the Court up-
held a law requiring notification of both parents but with a judicial bypass
provision.264 Then, in 2006, the Court struck down a law that required a
forty-eight-hour waiting period after parental notification before a minor
could obtain an abortion.265 The defect was the lack of an exception to pre-
serve the woman’s health. Minors have the same right to seek an abortion
without undue burden by the government, but they also face the thorny issue
of parental consent, as abortion is a medical procedure that would typically
be consented to by a parent rather than by the minor herself. But in Belotti,
the Court held that no third party, including a parent, can be given an abso-
lute veto over a minor’s decision to terminate a pregnancy.266 To that end, the
Court held that state laws requiring parental notification or consent for abor-
tion are constitutional only if the state provides a judicial bypass procedure
258 See, e.g., David Eisenberg et al., Cost as a Barrier to Long-Acting Revers-
ible Contraceptive (LARC) Use in Adolescents, 52 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 59, 62 (2013).
259 See CO. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH & ENV’T, Taking the Unintended Out of Preg-
nancy: Colorado’s Success with Long-Acting Reversible Contraception viii-ix (2017).
260 Sabrina Tavernise, Colorado Finds Startling Success in Effort to Curb Teenage
Births, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2015, at A1.
261 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
262 428 U.S. at 75.
263 443 U.S. 622, 635–37 (1979).
264 497 U.S. 417, 423 (1990).
265 Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of New England, 546 U.S. 320, 328 (2006).
266 443 U.S. at 643 (citing Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74).
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that allows the minor to obtain permission from a court to make the decision
on her own.267 To be constitutional, such a procedure must be expeditious,
confidential, and must allow the minor to make her own decision if (1) she is
mature enough to make an informed decision or (2) if her best interests
would be served by having an abortion.268
While the vast majority of states have passed laws enabling minors to
access contraception without parental consent, they have gone completely in
the opposite direction on abortion. Thirty-seven states require parental in-
volvement in a minor’s decision to have an abortion.269 In the remaining
states, young women are as free (or constrained) as adult women in their
decision to terminate a pregnancy, though they are likely to face greater
practical barriers regardless of the legality of their choice to terminate. But
in parental involvement states, pregnant minors are subject to the whim of
the state legislators who craft the bypass law, the judges who preside over
bypass hearings, and the attorneys and guardians ad litem who may be in-
volved in their cases. The hearings often reinforce stereotypical attitudes
about girls and their sexuality and force them into a situation where they
have to beg an authority figure for autonomy.270 The hearings focus on ma-
267 Id. at 649–51.
268 See id. at 643–45; see also Ohio v. Akron Ctr. For Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502,
506–07 (1990) (upholding Ohio’s bypass procedure against a constitutional challenge);
Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 298–99 (1997) (per curiam) (upholding Montana’s
bypass procedure against a constitutional challenge).
269 See GUTTMACHER INST., Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions (2019),
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/parental-involvement-minors-abortions
[https://perma.cc/QXD4-N5KN].
270 For discussion of how the bypass system operates in practice, see Amanda Jean
Stevenson et al., Denials of Judicial Bypass Petitions in Texas Before and After the 2016
Bypass Process Change: 2001-18, 110 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 351 (forthcoming Mar.
2020); Murray Levine et al., An Illustration of the Intersection of Social Science and the
Law: The Legal Rights of Adolescents to Make Medical Decisions, 30 HASTINGS WO-
MEN’S L.J. 241 (2019); Rachel Rebouché, Parental Involvement Laws and New Govern-
ance, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 175 (2011); Carol Sanger, Regulating Teenage Abortion
in the United States: Politics and Policy, 18 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 305 (2004); Carol
Sanger, Decisional Dignity; Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings, and the Misuse of Law,
18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409 (2009); CAROL SANGER, Sending Pregnant Teenagers to
Court, in ABOUT ABORTION: TERMINATING PREGNANCY IN TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
AMERICA 154–84 (2017); Helena Silverstein & Leanne Speitel, “Honey, I Have No
Idea” : Court Readiness to Handle Petitions to Waive Parental Consent for Abortion, 88
IOWA L. REV. 75 (2002); HELENA SILVERSTEIN, GIRLS ON THE STAND: HOW COURTS FAIL
PREGNANT MINORS (2007); AMANDA DENNIS ET AL., THE IMPACT OF LAWS REQUIRING
PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT FOR ABORTION: A LITERATURE REVIEW (2009); Elizabeth M.
Smith, A Follow-up Study of Women Who Request Abortion, 43 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIA-
TRY 574 (1973); Catherine Lewis, Minors’ Competence to Consent to Abortion, 42 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 84 (1987); Freddie Clary, Minor Women Obtaining Abortions: A Study of
Parental Notification in a Metropolitan Area, 72 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 283 (1982);
Kathryn Kost & Stanley Henshaw, Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortion Decisions,
24 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 196 (1992); V.G. Cartoof & L.V. Klerman, Parental Consent for
Abortion: Impact of the Massachusetts Law, 76 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 397 (1986); R.W.
Blum et al., Factors Associated with the Use of Court Bypass by Minors to Obtain Abor-
tion, 22 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 158 (1990); J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Choosing Abortion: Teens
Who Make the Decision Without Parental Involvement, GENDER ISSUES 3 (2003); Rachel
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turity, not equality, by constitutional design. Because the right to privacy is a
right grounded in autonomy, a dimension of the liberty protected under the
due process clause, granting the right to an under-age woman depends on her
ability to convince the judge that she is mature enough to responsibly exer-
cise her autonomy in decision-making. The inquiry is not focused on how an
unwanted pregnancy would interfere with her educational opportunities. The
framing of the right as a matter of “choice” obscures the inequalities in
education young women, but not men, face from being forced to carry to
term an unwanted pregnancy.
In the early challenges to contraceptive bans, plaintiffs explicitly drew
the connection between unwanted pregnancy and education; they argued that
if they could not control the timing of children, they would not be able to
complete high school, college, graduate programs, or training for a profes-
sion.271 Early litigation strategies pressed the connection between controlling
fertility and equal educational opportunity. But that thread largely has been
lost as abortion law has developed. Despite dicta in Casey, quoted above,
and some other opinions that reflected some understanding of the need for
women to be able to control reproduction in order to fully participate in
society, a sex equality grounding for reproductive rights never material-
ized.272 Given the current assault on reproductive control and the tenuous
nature of the constitutional protection, it is more important than ever to make
explicit the equality dimensions of restrictions on abortion rights. Moreover,
teen girls will be affected even more harshly than adult women by the new
wave of early gestational bans on abortion, if they are ever permitted to take
effect, as teens experience less regular menstrual cycles and therefore will be
less likely to detect a pregnancy in time.273
The harm to young women of the current system is not limited to con-
traception and abortion. There is no recognized autonomy right to high qual-
ity sex education that would inform or support contraceptive use,274 nor a
right to equality in relationships so as to make the right to use contraception
Rebouché, Report of a National Meeting: Parental Involvement Laws and the Judicial
Bypass, 37 LAW & INEQ. 21 (2019); Molly Redden, This is How Judges Humiliate Preg-
nant Teens Who Want Abortions, MOTHER JONES (Sept./Oct. 2014), https://www
.motherjones.com/politics/2014/10/teen-abortion-judicial-bypass-parental-notification/
[https://perma.cc/EW86-3UAZ]; Jamin B. Raskin, The Paradox of Judicial Bypass Pro-
ceedings, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 281 (2002).
271 See Siegel & Siegel, supra note 176, at 355. R
272 See Reva B. Siegel, Equality and Choice: Sex Equality Perspectives on Reproduc-
tive Rights in the Work of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 25 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 63, 73
(2013).
273 See Paula J. Adams Hillard, Menstruation in Adolescents: What’s Normal?, 10
Medscape J. Med. 295, 296 (2008); see also Megan K. Donovan, Guttmacher Inst., Ges-
tational Age Bans: Harmful at Any Stage of Pregnancy (2020), https://www.guttmacher
.org/gpr/2020/01/gestational-age-bans-harmful-any-stage-pregnancy [https://perma.cc/
BXK6-XMUY].
274 See, e.g., Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, The Failure of Abstinence-Only
Education: Minors Have a Right to Honest Talk About Sex, COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 12
(2006).
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meaningful. Not surprisingly, lower income and minority minors have the
weakest protections due to barriers to access.275 As a result, teenage girls of
color are especially likely to incur the costs of unwanted pregnancy, which
feed “the problem” narrative of teen pregnancy as the cause of crime, wel-
fare, and other burdens on society. In the educational setting, the pregnant
teen is assumed to be an educational problem, and the law’s focus is just on
getting her through the system rather than on maximizing her potential. The
concluding section explores the ways in which the law’s bifurcation of preg-
nancy as a sex equality issue and reproductive rights as a matter of privacy
has undermined both sets of rights and contributed to a myopic approach to
women’s educational equality.
IV. MISSED CONNECTIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR INTEGRATING
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND PREGNANCY IN
THE TITLE IX CONVERSATION
The parsing of pregnancy’s effects on education into an equality frame-
work and reproductive rights, notwithstanding their implications for educa-
tion, into a separate legal framework grounded in autonomy, has a number
of troubling implications. In terms of the effect on reproductive rights, this
divide contributes to the submergence of equality as a key dimension of
restrictions on women’s control over their reproductive lives. The right to
privacy stems from the liberty that the state must respect as a matter of
personal autonomy. It is fundamentally the right to be left alone in matters
central to a person’s autonomy. The ways in which reproduction affects wo-
men’s educational attainment and career goals are extrinsic to the right to
privacy analysis.
Unfortunately, the core statute promising girls and women educational
equality fails to bridge the gap between reproductive control and a right to
sex equality in education. Title IX is vulnerable to Reva Siegel’s critique that
“courts and the nation often do not grasp the relationships” between wo-
men’s reproductive control and sex equality.276 The consequences of this fail-
ure are generally negative for both liberty-based reproductive rights and
equality-based rights in education.
For reproductive rights, leaving equality out of the calculus—and spe-
cifically, those inequalities in education that women confront due to preg-
nancy—ultimately serves to weaken the justifications for ensuring girls and
women full control of their reproductive lives. With respect to abortion
rights in particular, privacy as the grounding for the right to terminate a
pregnancy presupposes a fully autonomous person who is entitled to make
275 See, e.g., Sadia Halder et al., Reproductive Health Disparities: A Focus on Family
Planning and Prevention Among Minority Women and Adolescents, 2 GLOBAL AD-
VANCES HEALTH & MED. 94, 96 (2013).
276 See Siegel, supra note 272, at 80. R
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fundamental personal decisions. From the beginning, it was a poor fit for
women who have not reached majority age and whose decision-making is
often displaced by parents, legal guardians and/or the state. Even for adult
women, privacy is vulnerable to loss when the decisions sought to be
respected are impugned. Consider the rhetoric commonly used to describe
the privacy right, the right to choose, or “choice.” Framing abortion as a
matter of choice invites restrictions when pregnancy is viewed as the product
of poor choices. Not surprisingly then, abortion rights are the most robust
when an unwanted pregnancy is widely understood as not the woman’s fault.
The prevalence of laws allowing exceptions for rape and incest in otherwise
sweeping restrictions on funding abortion traces back to disparaging dis-
courses about women’s fault in becoming pregnant. Grounding the abortion
right in equality might have homed in on the ways sex stereotypes about
female sexuality underpin abortion restrictions, but privacy gives no traction
to such arguments. Framing the abortion right as a matter of choice presup-
poses full agency, making it easier to blame a woman’s poor choices for an
unwanted pregnancy. Such discourses make women unsympathetic subjects
for abortion rights and invite further restrictions.
Arguments for centering equality in a reproductive rights discourse
have long been part of a critique by feminist legal scholars of the liberty-
based framework for reproductive rights.277 Focusing this critique on ine-
quality in education and on its connection to reproductive control for women
who are school-age or pursuing higher education adds a new and important
dimension to this critique. Considering reproductive rights in relation to edu-
cation and the rights of school-age women, and teenage girls in particular,
highlights how poorly the autonomy framework works for minors, who are
subject to additional restraints on their reproductive lives. For example, it is
unsurprising (but problematic) that the judicial bypass proceeding for minors
focuses exclusively on the young woman’s maturity and not on her educa-
tional opportunity.
The law’s grounding of reproductive rights in autonomy, unmoored
from equality, has also opened the door to a number of damaging discourses
that have a blowback effect that drains support for pregnant and parenting
students in education. Title IX’s inapplicability to those aspects of reproduc-
tion occurring prior to pregnancy leaves unaddressed the conditions of ine-
quality under which young women face an unwanted pregnancy. By steering
the conversation about sex equality in education away from women’s repro-
ductive control, Title IX stages an equality discourse that leaves out much of
what contributes to sex inequality in education. Title IX’s boundaries thereby
reinforce the understanding that reproductive rights present issues that are
distinct from issues of sex equality in education and that unwanted preg-
nancy is a matter of individual responsibility and poor choices. This under-
standing, in turn, undermines support for strong equal rights for pregnant
277 See, e.g., id. (reviewing the history of such arguments in litigation).
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and parenting students. If the educational consequences of pregnancy and
parenting can be attributed to a student’s poor choices, it is easier to write off
these students as undeserving under-achievers. This, in turn, feeds into the
stigmatized view of pregnant students and makes it easier to pathologize
teen pregnancy in a way that undermines empathy for this population of
students. This kind of discourse supports an understanding of Title IX that
sets a low bar for what schools have to do to accommodate pregnant stu-
dents. In addition, stigmatized views about pregnant students make it less
likely that educators will voluntarily adhere to a strong set of rights—regard-
less of what those rights are—especially given Title IX’s weak enforcement
structure and the low likelihood that a pregnant student or new parent will
sue.
Framing reproductive rights as a matter of liberty, and not equality, has
also meant that the protected right is limited to decisional autonomy and
does not encompass access to the resources necessary for effectuating wo-
men’s choices. The right to privacy grounding for both contraception and
abortion rights is a right to decide without government interference (within
the limits discussed above). It is not a right to government support in eradi-
cating the barriers to contraception or abortion access. As discussed in Part
II, barriers of access particularly impede girls and women of color and with
lower incomes, resulting in disparate capacities to exercise “choice” in
preventing or terminating pregnancy. The racial and class disparities in who
can access these rights also contribute to the racialization and stigmatization
of the pregnant teen subject, described in Part I. These race and class im-
pacts fuel the narrative of the educationally expendable pregnant student,
undeserving of more than modest accommodations.
Grounding reproduction in a framework of choice not only contributes
to the stigma surrounding pregnant students but also supports a discourse of
contagion that underlies the most blatant discrimination against pregnant stu-
dents. Under this logic, if young women have reproductive autonomy and
the right to avoid pregnancy is grounded in choice, the visibility of pregnant
and parenting students might negatively influence the choices of other stu-
dents. As Kendra Fershee explains, the rationale for the pre-Title IX practice
of excluding pregnant students from school is “rooted in a fear that provid-
ing help to pregnant students might positively reinforce their ‘bad behavior’
of getting pregnant in the first place,” and a concern that the “character
flaw” in the pregnant student should be “negatively reinforced,” lest it en-
courage others to follow suit.278
Cornelia Pillard makes a similar point in her critique of the law’s divide
between liberty and equality in connection with reproductive rights: “Argu-
ments from equality may be weakened by the sense that laws and policies
need not change to be fairer to women if, supplied with the liberty to control
278 Fershee, supra note 132, at 317. R
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fertility and have abortions, women thereby become ‘just like men.’” 279 In
other words, if young women are presumed to have the choice to remain
unencumbered by pregnancy and motherhood, then perhaps they do not need
(or deserve) help from antidiscrimination law to accommodate the effects of
pregnancy on education in order to have equal opportunity. Under this logic,
the rhetoric of choice may be used to limit what schools must do to accom-
modate pregnancy and motherhood—if getting pregnant and having a child is
a choice, then that argues against going to great lengths to protect students
from educational opportunity costs. Choices, after all, have opportunity
costs.
Separating reproductive control and educational equality into distinct
bodies of law makes it more difficult to see their intersections and how each
set of rights reinforces the limitations of the other. One example of this dy-
namic is that Title IX’s promise of educational equality for pregnant students
actually plays into the anti-abortion discourse that views carrying a preg-
nancy to term as a temporary inconvenience, instead of a life-altering pro-
position, as it often is. Title IX analogizes pregnancy to temporary disability,
making it easier to keep the educational consequences out of the conversa-
tion about abortion and contraception. Abortion rights advocates working
within a separate body of law may not be steeped in the particularities of
Title IX’s framework. They may not be able to elaborate the ways in which
Title IX’s equality framework falls short of actually neutralizing the educa-
tional consequences of pregnancy.
At the same time, an autonomy-based framework for reproductive
rights gives rise to a narrative of choice that reinforces a discourse of
“shame and blame” that serves to undermine educational supports for preg-
nant students and new mothers.280 Educators and lawyers who work within
Title IX may lack a sufficient understanding of the limits of reproductive
rights and the gap between the promise of choice and the reality of con-
strained choices to be able to effectively push back against this narrative.
Reproductive rights lawyers and Title IX lawyers operate in separate silos of
law with little cross-pollination of ideas or collaboration between them.
Bridging the gap at this point in the development of the law will not be
easy. Importing stronger reproductive rights into Title IX would be an uphill
battle to say the least. Although restrictions on contraception, pregnancy ter-
mination, and sex education that would empower young women in their sex-
ual relationships deeply implicate issues of educational equality for girls and
women, Title IX’s inapplicability to these areas is, at least for now, firmly
entrenched. Expanding reproductive rights discourse to draw upon educa-
279 Pillard, supra note 37, at 942. R
280 Lauren Ann Rankin, Shame and Blame Campaign: The Use of Shame in Teen
Pregnancy Prevention Campaigns (May 2014) (M.A. thesis, Rutgers University) (on file
with author), https://doi.org/doi:10.7282/T3DZ06M1(criticizing teen pregnancy preven-
tion public education campaigns for stigmatizing young women’s sexuality and blaming
teen mothers for being irresponsible sexual actors who contribute to poverty and crime).
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tional equality arguments for lifting restrictions on women’s reproductive
control also appears unlikely to succeed, given the defensive posture of the
reproductive rights movement. At least for now, reproductive rights are on
the precipice of retrenchment rather than expansion.
As important as the gaps in legal doctrine and the disconnect between
claims for educational equality and reproductive rights is the effect of this
dichotomy on public understanding and the discourses that undermine sup-
port for both sets of rights. Title IX scholars and advocates and reproductive
rights scholars and advocates share a common agenda, yet rarely connect
their work and expertise. Reproductive rights lawyers need to find creative
ways to highlight the educational costs of unwanted pregnancy and the costs
to sex equality in education of denying young women full reproductive con-
trol. To push back against narratives of blame and shame that drain support
for equality rights, Title IX advocates for pregnant and parenting students
should call out the restrictions on autonomy and inequalities in social life
and in the health care system that deny young women meaningful agency
over their sexuality and reproductive lives. This article has sought to take an
initial step toward bringing sex equality in education into dialogue with re-
productive autonomy.
